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 Digital Sampling v. Appropriation Art:     
Why Is One Stealing and the Other Fair 
Use? A Proposal for a Code of Best Practices 
in Fair Use for Digital Music Sampling 
Melissa Eckhause* 
“It ain’t hard to tell, I’m the new Jean Michel, Surrounded by Warhols . . 
. I’m the modern day Pablo, Picasso baby.”– Jay-Z1  
INTRODUCTION 
“Thou shalt not steal” – so began the court opinion that effectively ended 
unauthorized digital sampling in the music industry.2  Since then, digital music 
sampling has been referred to as theft,3 pirating,4 and copyright infringement.5  
 
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.  An earlier draft 
of this Article served as my L.L.M. thesis at the University of California, Berkeley, 
School of Law.  I would like to thank my thesis advisor Pamela Samuelson for her 
invaluable comments on this Article.  I also am grateful to Pat Aufderheide, Sean 
Freeder, Peter Jaszi, Kembrew McLeod, Peter Menell, Robert Merges, and Jennifer 
Urban for their thoughts and guidance on this project and to my family for their encour-
agement and support.  My thanks also go out to the anonymous music industry profes-
sionals who took the time to complete my Survey.  Notice and Disclaimer: I serve on 
the Committee on Intellectual Property for the College Art Association.  All views ex-
pressed in this Article are my own and should not in any way be attributed to the Col-
lege Art Association. 
 1. Jay-Z, Picasso Baby, on MAGNA CARTA HOLY GRAIL (ROC Nation LLC 
2013). 
 2. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).  For purposes of this Article, digital sampling is defined as “the in-
corporation of short segments of prior sound recordings into a new recording.”  Newton 
v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Jarvis v. A & M Records, 
827 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.N.J. 1993) (“Digital sampling has been described as: the 
conversion of analog sound waves into a digital code. The digital code that describes 
the sampled music . . . can then be reused, manipulated or combined with other digital-
ized or recorded sounds using a machine with digital data processing capabilities, such 
as a . . . computerized synthesizer.” (alterations in original)); TufAmerica, Inc. v. Dia-
mond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting the Oxford Dictionary’s 
definition of sampling as “the technique of digitally encoding music or sound and re-
using it as part of a composition or recording”). 
 3. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 888 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 890. 
 5. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005); 
see also Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 295 (“[T]here can be no more brazen stealing of music 
1
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Even when artists sample two seconds of a song, courts admonish them, “Get 
a license or do not sample.”6  Yet, somehow, “thou shalt not steal” does not 
apply in the visual arts world.  Instead when visual artists sample whole pho-
tographs, courts label it appropriation art, collage, and fair use.7 
This Article examines the disparate treatment of music and visual arts 
sampling under copyright law.  Not only does this Article argue that the more 
liberal fair use principles adopted in recent visual arts cases should be applied 
to digital music sampling,8 but it also sets forth a preliminary Code of Best 
Practices in Fair Use for Digital Music Sampling (“Digital Music Sampling 
Code”).9  Part I of this Article begins by tracing the long history of both musi-
cians and visual artists sampling other artists’ works by incorporating them into 
new pieces, often without permission from the original artists.  This Article 
shows that both digital music sampling and appropriation art are forms of the 
artistic tradition of collage, and as artistically analogous acts, they deserve to 
be treated alike under copyright law. 
Part II gives a brief overview of the copyright law principles that apply to 
sampling.  Part III then reviews the leading digital sampling and appropriation 
art cases.10  Starting with Blanch v. Koons,11 the path of music and visual arts 
collage cases began to diverge and the courts in visual arts cases started em-
bracing transformative works as fair use.  While Blanch led to a resurgence of 
fair use in visual arts cases, such as Cariou v. Prince12 and Seltzer v. Green 
Day, Inc.,13 the defense of fair use all but disappeared in music cases for many 
years.  Moreover, the decision in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films14 
seemingly eviscerated music sampling’s de minimis defense.  As one legal 
 
than digital sampling . . . .”); Toho Co., LTD v. Priority Records, LLC, CV 01-
04744SVW(RZx), 2002 WL 33840993, at *3 (Mar. 27, 2002 C.D. Cal.) (“Digital sam-
pling without permission has been held repeatedly to constitute copyright infringe-
ment.”); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2578 
n.285 (2009) (“Courts have been quite hostile to digital sampling of copyrighted mu-
sic.”). 
 6. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801. 
 7. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Blanch v. 
Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 8. See Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition 
in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2013) (“‘[A]ppropriation art’ is often, though 
not always, deemed fair use, while even minimal digital sampling (mostly for hip-hop 
music) generally is not excused.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 9. The preliminary Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Digital Music Sampling 
(“Digital Music Sampling Code”) is on file with the author and available upon request. 
 10. For purposes of this Article, appropriation art is defined as “the more or less 
direct taking over into a work of art a real object or even an existing work of art.”  
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699 (citation omitted) (quotation omitted). 
 11. 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 12. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 13. 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 14. 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
2
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commentator noted, “the rulings on digital sampling effectively have fore-
closed the ability to quote music at all.”15  However, several cases have 
emerged in recent years that support the unlicensed use of digital music sam-
ples under either the de minimis or fair use doctrines.  For example, in VMG 
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone,16 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit spe-
cifically rejected the decision in Bridgeport, thereby setting up a circuit split 
that has yet to be resolved. 
Despite the recent case law developments supporting unlicensed digital 
sampling, the music industry remains stuck in a clearance culture that requires 
all samples to be licensed.  Many legal and music commentators have recog-
nized this problem and proposed solutions.  The proposals for reform, however, 
have focused on either adopting a compulsory licensing system or amending 
the Copyright Act to expressly address digital sampling.17  Attempts to imple-
ment these solutions have repeatedly failed.  Therefore, this Article suggests a 
different approach. 
Part IV proposes the adoption of a Digital Music Sampling Code.  This 
code would be similar to the codes of best practices for fair use adopted in other 
creative industries.  In particular, given the analogy between appropriation art 
and digital music sampling, this code would borrow heavily from the Code of 
Best Practices in Fair Use for the Visual Arts (“Visual Arts Code”) promul-
gated by the College Art Association (“CAA”) under the guidance of Peter 
Jaszi and Patricia Aufderheide.18 
As the first step towards creating a fair use code for digital music sam-
pling and as part of the research for this Article, the author conducted an anon-
ymous online survey (“Survey”) of professionals in the music industry in the 
United States from all musical genres and backgrounds.19  The Survey included 
respondents who use digital samples in their work, artists who are sampled, 
and other stakeholders who have an interest in sampling, such as music label 
professionals, publishers, and composers.  The Survey questioned them about 
their opinions, experiences, and practices concerning digital music sampling.  
In particular, the Survey questioned participants about the circumstances, if 
any, under which they believe sampling of third-party copyrighted material 
may be unlicensed.  Overall, 61.81% of the Survey respondents believed that 
whether an artist should seek permission or obtain a license to use a sample of 
 
 15. JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 38 
(2011). 
 16. 824 F.3d 871, 884–86 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 17. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Adapting Copyright for the Mashup Generation, 164 
U. PA. L. REV. 441, 488 (2016) (proposing compulsory licensing scheme); see also John 
W. Gregory, A Necessary Global Discussion for Improvements to U.S. Copyright Law 
on Music Sampling, 15 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 4, 109 (2012). 
 18. COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR THE 
VISUAL ARTS 3 (2015), http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/fair-use/best-practices-fair-use-
visual-arts.pdf [hereinafter Visual Arts Code]. 
 19. The Survey questionnaire, including the informed consent form that partici-
pants signed, is on file with the author and can be provided upon request. 
3
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another artist’s work depends on the circumstances.  As a result, the author 
drafted the Digital Music Sampling Code, which attempts to articulate princi-
ples for determining under what circumstances permission is needed and when 
it is not.  The Digital Music Sampling Code is also based on broad fair use 
principles, music case law, and fair use codes from other industries. 
I. THE HISTORY OF SAMPLING 
Pablo Picasso has been quoted as saying, “Bad artists copy.  Great artists 
steal.”20  Meanwhile, Igor Stravinksy reportedly remarked, “A good composer 
does not imitate, he steals.”21  No matter who said what first, the sentiment is 
the same.  Both in music and visual arts, the practice of stealing or sampling 
from predecessors is nothing new.  Indeed, in some sense all art is derivative 
and builds upon past works.  As Justice Story explained, 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if 
any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original 
throughout.  Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must 
necessarily borrew [sic], and use much which was well known and used 
before.22 
One Survey respondent further noted, “[W]e’re basically to the point now 
where almost everything is going to soon be derivative to one extent or another 
. . . .”, while another stated, “[E]verything I create is more or less built on what 
others have made.”  This Part will examine the history of both visual and mu-
sical artists appropriating – or sampling – from those who came before them, 
and it will show that digital music sampling is just the modern day version of 
this practice. 
A. History of Sampling in Visual Art 
In 1912, Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque coined the term “collage” to 
refer to their style of art that appropriated existing images, such as magazine 
 
 20. Lucille M. Ponte, Preserving Creativity from Endless Digital Exploitation: 
Has the Time Come for the New Concept of Copyright Dilution?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 34, 56 n.111 (2009). 
 21. Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf E. Kuenzli, I Collage, Therefore I Am: An Intro-
duction to Cutting Across Media, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: APPROPRIATION ART, 
INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf E. 
Kuenzli eds., 2011); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: 
Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 550–51 
(2006) (“Musical borrowing is a pervasive aspect of musical creation” and yet the cur-
rent copyright legal regime is based on “Romantic author assumptions” that envision 
“musical production as autonomous, independent and in some cases even reflecting 
genius.”). 
 22. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). 
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illustrations and other “found material” like floral wallpaper, to create new 
mixed media pieces.23  By mixing incongruent materials, new meaning was 
brought to the individual elements.24  This form of art, which was part of the 
Cubist movement, also brought attention and criticism to the rise of popular 
media.  Many other art genres – futurists, constructivists, surrealists, and ab-
stract expressionists – would later embrace the technique of collage as a means 
of expressing their social and political views.25 
The Dada art movement, which arose from the travesties of World War I, 
also believed in recycling and reassembling material and rejected the notion of 
originality in art.26  For example, Dada artist Marcel Duchamp incorporated 
what he called “readymades,” which were manufactured objects, such as bicy-
cle wheels, into his work.27  One of his most famous and controversial pieces, 
Fountain, was a white-glazed, ceramic urinal that he placed in an art gallery 
thus creating “new thought for [the] object.”28  Meanwhile, German Dada art-
ists invented the technique of photomontage, which involved making a collage 
out of photographs.29 
The 1950s saw the birth of Pop Art.  One landmark piece was Richard 
Hamilton’s collage, Just What Is It That Makes Today’s Homes So Different, 
So Appealing?, from 1956.30  This work commented on the modern consumer 
world by combining culture images, such as an ad for The Jazz Singer, a Toot-
sie Pop, and a Ford emblem, that were cut-out from magazines and pasted to-
gether.31  Andy Warhol later began taking everyday, banal objects, like Camp-
bell soup cans and Brillo soap-pad boxes, and recasting them as fine art.  This, 
too, caused the viewer to examine these objects in a new light and question the 
motives of mass production.32  Warhol also used a silkscreen technique to place 
 
 23. Christine Poggi, In Defiance of Painting: Cubism, Futurism, and the Invention 
of Collage, in MASHUP: THE BIRTH OF MODERN CULTURE 53 (2016). 
 24. RUDOLF E. KUENZLI & FRANCIS M. NAUMANN, MARCEL DUCHAMP: ARTIST OF 
THE CENTURY 76 (1989). 
 25. DIANE MAURER-MATHISON, COLLAGE, ASSEMBLAGE, AND ALTERED ART: 
CREATING UNIQUE IMAGES AND OBJECTS 13 (2008). 
 26. John Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and 
Control, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1237, 1256. 
 27. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992); Bruce Grenville, Mashup: 
The Birth of Modern Culture, in MASHUP: THE BIRTH OF MODERN CULTURE, supra note 
23, at 23. 
 28. Jane C. Ginsburg, “Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: U.S. Cop-
yright Protection for Applied Art, 40 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 43 n.142 (2016). 
 29. Grenville, supra note 27, at 23. 
 30. KLAUS HONNEF, POP ART 40 (2015). 
 31. Id. 
 32. DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL 
CULTURE 49 (2005). 
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actual newspaper stories and photographs, including those of famous celebri-
ties like Elvis Presley and Elizabeth Taylor, into his works.33  In doing so, War-
hol “was able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial exploita-
tion of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on the 
dehumanization of celebrity itself.”34  Warhol introduced the photo-silkscreen 
method to Robert Rauschenberg who would use it to incorporate masterpieces 
like Venus at Her Toilet by Peter Paul Rubens into his paintings.35 
Later came the “Pictures Generation” – artists who used mass media im-
ages to critique contemporary culture.36  Often this involved re-photographing 
famous works.  For example, in Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans photo-
graph series, she re-photographed well-known Walker Evans’ photographs 
from the Depression era.37  Richard Prince, whose work and lawsuits will be 
discussed in further detail in Part III, became famous for re-photographing 
Marlboro cigarette advertisements and presenting them as fine art.38  This style 
of art came to be known as “appropriation art,” which has been defined as “the 
more or less direct taking over into a work of art a real object or even an exist-
ing work of art.”39 
Often the goal of appropriation artists is not to present the borrowed im-
ages as their own but rather to criticize or comment on society, especially when 
using popular or highly commercial works.  Neither Levine nor Prince made 
substantive changes to their borrowed imagery.  Yet, the effect of placing these 
images in a different cultural setting was radical and gave new perspective and 
meaning to the works.40  In the case of Prince, his Marlboro series caused the 
viewer to reevaluate the iconic image of the macho cowboy of the American 
West.41  And some of the “supposed value” of appropriation art “comes from 
the very fact that the work was created by someone else.”42 
Today, artists no longer have to rely on physically cutting and pasting 
images with scissors and glue to make appropriation art and collage.  Instead, 
they can do it digitally with nothing more than a computer and the Internet.  
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001). 
 35. BRANDON TAYLOR, COLLAGE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ART 176 (2004); see 
also Nicholas B. Lewis, Comment, Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use De-
fense Adapt to New Re-Contextualized Forms of Music and Art?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 
267, 281 n.70 (2005). 
 36. Grenville, supra note 27, at 32. 
 37. Id. at 33. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 40. See William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: 
An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (“[Appropriation] artist’s 
technical skills are less important than his conceptual ability to place images in different 
settings and, thereby, change their meaning.”). 
 41. Cowboys, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/arts-curricu-
lum/topic/cowboys (last visited May 24, 2019). 
 42. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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Moreover, the practice of collage is no longer confined to the rarified air in 
Manhattan and Paris.  Collage has surged in popularity in recent years, espe-
cially among amateur artists.43  “Because of shifts in both art and technology, 
copying has now become a central subject of art – as well as a basic tool of 
how people make it.”44  A similar shift occurred in the music world where 
sampling is now a common practice. 
B. History of Sampling in Music 
Music sampling has a long history as well.  With respect to musical com-
positions, classical composers like Brahms and Mendelssohn borrowed notes 
and chords from Beethoven, and Debussy borrowed from Wagner’s Tristan.45  
Igor Stravinsky took many of the The Rite of Spring’s melodies from Russian 
folk music while Handel “ruthlessly plagiarized.”46 
Sampling of sound recordings is for obvious reasons a more recent phe-
nomenon.  The phonograph was not invented until 1877,47 and the ability to 
sample recorded sounds by incorporating parts of an original recording directly 
into a new one was limited by technology and cost until the 1970s.48  The first 
sampling of sound recordings was seen in Paris in the 1940s.49  There, French 
composers combined music with everyday noises and sounds to develop sound 
collages that were called “musique concrete.”50  This costly and laborious tech-
nique relied on manipulating magnetic tapes through cutting and splicing.51  
Between 1940 and 1970, sampling was more of an arthouse project like “Col-
lage #1 (Blue Suede)” by James Tenney in 1961 or a novelty gag like Bill Bu-
chanan and Dickie Goodman’s “The Flying Saucer,” which took famous lines 
from hit songs to report on the story of an alien visit.52 
In the 1960s, music producers in Jamaica used portable sound systems to 
take pre-recorded rhythm tracks and splice in their own powerful vocals, 
 
 43. Danielle Krysa, Introduction, in COLLAGE: CONTEMPORARY ARTISTS HUNT 
AND GATHER, CUT AND PASTE, MASH UP AND TRANSFORM 11 (2014). 
 44. Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 569 
(2016). 
 45. KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND 
CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 22–25 (2011); see also Sherri Carl Hampel, Note, Are 
Samplers Getting a Bum Rap?: Copyright Infringement or Technological Creativity?, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 583–84 (discussing how musicians have been borrowing mu-
sical phrases and themes from other artists since the dawn of Western music). 
 46. Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 47. Alan Korn, Comment, Renaming That Tune: Aural Collage, Parody and Fair 
Use, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 321, 321 (1992). 
 48. E. Scott Johnson, Note, Protecting Distinctive Sounds: The Challenge of Dig-
ital Sampling, 2 J. L. & TECH. 273, 274 & n.12 (1987). 
 49. Id. at 289 n.102. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Thomas W. Joo, Remix Without Romance, 44 CONN. L. REV. 415, 426 (2011). 
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chants, growls, and shouts.53  These were called dub remixes, which was a pre-
cursor to rap.54  Dub showed how one instrumental track could be transformed 
into many different versions, each reflecting the artist’s own vision. 
In the 1970s, while the Picture Generation artists like Richard Prince and 
Sherrie Levine were re-photographing famous images, a different style of sam-
pling was occurring in the South Bronx.55  DJs like DJ Kool Herc, who was 
from Jamaica, began pioneering the practice of using two turntables, an audio 
mixer, and a pile of records to combine songs and extend breakbeats.56  An 
MC, or “‘Master of Ceremonies or Microphone Controller,’ or ‘[a] rapper who 
is either the host of an event’ or ‘someone with enough flow and skill to be 
considered a master of the art of rap’”57 would then rhyme or rap over the mu-
sic.58  At first, these were strictly public performances occurring at apartment 
buildings, parks, and community centers.59  No sound recordings were made 
of the resulting music.60 
Sampling in the early days relied on analog technology.61  As such, it was 
often a time-consuming project involving hours layering sampled loops and 
sounds.62  With the invention of digital synthesizers that had Musical Instru-
ment Digital Interface (“MIDI”) keyboard controls, sampling became easier 
and cheaper.63  Musicians could now use the samplers to take a portion of an 
already existing sound recording, incorporate it into a new work, and digitally 
manipulate and alter it.64  A digital sampler became like any other instrument 
used to create music.65 
Sampling was done for a variety of reasons.  Sometimes it was born out 
of necessity.  Artists could not afford the musical instruments they needed to 
make certain sounds, and even if they could afford it, they did not know how 
 
 53. David Katz, Scratch the Super Ape: An Embodiment of Dub’s Mashup Cul-
ture, in MASHUP: THE BIRTH OF MODERN CULTURE, supra note 23, at 155–57. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting MC, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/de-
fine.php?term=mc (last visited Mar. 18, 2019)). 
 58. Stephanie Rebick, The Infinite Archive: Sampling in the Digital Age, in 
MASHUP: THE BIRTH OF MODERN CULTURE, supra note 23, at 279. 
 59. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 53. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 21. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 61. 
 65. See Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the Ameri-
can Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad “Rap”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 882 (1992) 
(“A digital sampler is an important instrument in the evolving art form of computer-
assisted musical composition . . . .”). 
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to play the instrument.66  A couple of the Survey respondents reported that they 
did not “know how to recreate the sampled sound.”  One respondent stated that 
he or she “lack[ed] the skills resources [sic] to compose,” while another noted 
that samples “give access to sounds that one may not have the equipment to 
create, i.e. minimoog, Fender Rhodes, French horns, lush realistic strings.”  
Other times, sampling was done for social and political commentary.67 
By the late 1980s, the price of sequencers and samplers dropped dramat-
ically, enabling more DJs to afford them.68  It was during this period that sam-
pling entered what some commentators have called “the golden age of sam-
pling.”69  Acts like Public Enemy and The Beastie Boys released innovative 
records that contained hundreds of aural fragments, thereby creating a rich col-
lage of sounds.70  The practice of sampling was not isolated to New York City.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the electronic band, The Justified Ancients of 
Mu Mu (The JAMs), later to be known as The KLF, created an album that 
aggressively sampled everyone from The Beatles to Whitney Houston.71 
By 1996, “digital sampling ha[d] become so pervasive that many musi-
cians and engineers . . . regard[ed] it as being indispensable in the music indus-
try.”72  The way that music is created also began to change.  No longer did a 
bunch of musicians with instruments have to enter a studio to create a record.73  
Now all those instrumental sounds could be created by one person on a com-
puter.  In essence, anyone with a computer could be a musician. 
In light of these developments, sampling is now completely digitized.  
Moreover, artists now can “mashup” works by juxtaposing the melody of one 
song with the instrumentals of another.74  Some mashups contain no new sound 
recorded content at all.  The originality is derived from how they are mixed and 
altered.  For example, Danger Mouse created the groundbreaking Grey Album 
that mashed up Jay-Z’s vocals from The Black Album with The Beatles’ music 
from “The White Album.”75  While sampling was initially mostly confined to 
the hip-hop and rap genres,76 it is now a widely accepted practice that is used 
 
 66. Julian Azran, Bring Back the Noise: How Cariou v. Prince Will Revitalize Sam-
pling, 38 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 69, 84 (2014) (“Sampling was viewed as a necessity to 
many early hip-hop artists who lacked the resources to purchase musical instruments 
and lessons”). 
 67. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 53. 
 68. See id. at 61. 
 69. See, e.g., at 19. 
 70. Rebick, supra note 58, at 279. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copy-
ing, Fair Use, 3 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 271, 278 (1996) (quotations omitted). 
 73. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45 at 53. 
 74. See Menell, supra note 17, at 453. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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in many types of music.  In other words, sampling is no longer a fringe move-
ment but a mainstream practice.77 
C. Digital Music Sampling Is Another Form of Collage and               
Appropriation Art 
Music and visual sampling should not be pigeonholed into separate cate-
gories.  Rather, they are both forms of collage and the long-standing practice 
of creating something new with found objects.78  One commentator has noted 
that “[h]ip-hop stands as the most widely disseminated specific collage practice 
yet to appear on the stage of history . . . .”79  Digital sampling and appropriation 
art share a number of characteristics, including “recycling appropriation rather 
than unique originative creation, the eclectic mixing of styles, the enthusiastic 
embracing of the new technology and mass culture, the challenging of mod-
ernist notions of aesthetic autonomy and artistic purity.”80 
Courts, too, have noted the link between digital music sampling and col-
lage.81  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently opined that 
musical digital sampling involved a “physical taking” similar to the taking that 
occurs when a computer program “‘sample[s]’ a piece of one photograph and 
insert[s] it into another photograph or work of art.”82  The tools of a visual artist 
and musician may differ, but the practice is largely the same.  Both cut existing 
works and paste them into new ones. 
For many artists, musical or visual, collage is all about the hunt for inter-
esting “found materials.”83  Some musicians describe their practice of “crate 
digging”  – culling through and listening to troves of long-forgotten vinyl rec-
ords.84  Similarly, many visual collage artists spend hours searching for the 
 
 77. See WHO SAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/ (last visited May 24, 2019) 
(documenting over 575,000 samples); see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 803–04 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[D]igital sampling has become so com-
monplace and rap music has become such a significant part of the record industry.”). 
 78. Twenty Survey respondents reported that they used samples because they 
“[e]njoy[ed] discovering forgotten music,” while twelve respondents stated that they 
used samples in their music to “create a music collage.” 
 79. Joshua Clover, Ambiguity and Theft, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: 
APPROPRIATION ART, INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 
21, at 89. 
 80. Richard Shusterman, The Fine Art of Rap, 22 NEW LITERARY HIST. 613, 614 
(1991). 
 81. Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1026 (3d Cir. 2008) (using 
sound clips, defendant “was ‘sampling’ itself, making a collage, taking a small piece of 
an old work and using it in a new work – as when a hip-hop group samples the drum 
part from James Brown’s ‘Funky Drummer.’”); see also Staggs v. West, No. PJM 08-
728, 2009 WL 2579665 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2009). 
 82. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 83. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 22–25. 
 84. Id. 
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perfect images.85  Musicians and artists tend to frequent the same establish-
ments – attics, junk shops, garage sales, swap meets, and thrift shops – looking 
for old materials to recycle.86  Many take pride in championing these long-
forgotten works and introducing them to new audiences.87  One Survey re-
spondent noted, “I don’t really use anything that is remotely popular.  Usually 
stuff that nobody knows about.”  This included “[w]eird snippets that one 
would not really know was in the original song unless they really really lis-
tened.”88  Collage artist Jose Romussi works with found objects because “they 
want to be given a new perspective and a new moment in time.”89  He wants to 
“make sure that whatever has already been forgotten is kept in the present.”90 
How all of these found materials are then arranged is also an important 
step in the collage process.91  Many times, multiple samples are densely layered 
over original materials to create a richly textured piece.92  Old images may be 
juxtaposed against contemporary ones.  Bold colors or textures may be added 
to a canvas.  Contrasting vocals or sounds may be combined with a musical 
snippet.93  Some samples are altered.  Musically, this may involve changing 
the pitch or tempo.94  Visually, this may involve cropping or aging materials.  
Some samples are obscured,95 while others are prominently featured.96 
Visual and musical artists sample for similar reasons.  Using existing ma-
terials is often necessary for political or cultural commentary.97  For example, 
in her music video for “Formation,” Beyoncé used samples from artist Anthony 
Barré as a means of political and social commentary about “black Southern 
 
 85. Krysa, supra note 43, at 145. 
 86. Id. at 261; Anthony Zinonos, Foreword, in COLLAGE: CONTEMPORARY 
ARTISTS HUNT AND GATHER, CUT AND PASTE, MASH UP AND TRANSFORM, supra note 
43, at 320. 
 87. Daphne Keller, The Musician as Thief: Digital Culture & Copyright Law, in 
SOUND UNBOUND: SAMPLING DIGITAL MUSIC AND CULTURE 143 (Paul D. Miller ed., 
2008). 
 88. Id. 
 89. José́ Romussi, AGORA COLLECTS, http://projects.agoracollective.org/agoracol-
lects/jose-romussi/ (last visited May 24, 2019). 
 90. Krysa, supra note 43, at 161. 
 91. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 258 (“In many cases, sound collage 
creates something new and interesting from its constituent parts.”).  Another Survey 
respondent noted, “Flipping a sample has a sound to it that it [sic] pure in a way.” 
 92. Another Survey respondent said, “I’ve sampled myself, to be able to rhythmi-
cally chop and paste beats and or layers, beat or sounds.” 
 93. Some Survey respondents stated that samples were used to add “acapellas, vo-
cals” or to add “[w]eird snippets.” 
 94. One respondent noted he had used “rhythmic manipulation.” 
 95. “Samples can be altered to the point when they are unrecognizable.  So [sic] it 
basically becomes a new type of a [sic] original sample from a different artist.” 
 96. P. Diddy used a sample of The Police’s Every Breath You Take as basically 
his entire song.  See Puff Daddy & Faith Evans, I’ll Be Missing You, on NO WAY OUT 
(Bad Boy Records 1997). 
 97. Some respondents used samples for “criticism or commentary.” 
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resilience” in New Orleans.98  Images of political figures are often used in art 
for the larger purpose of criticizing ideological viewpoints.99  Collage can be 
used to comment on culture as well.  For example, Barbara Kruger uses found 
images, often advertisements, paired with slogans, such as “Buy me, I’ll 
change your life,” to criticize mass consumerism.100  The band Negativland 
creates aural collages from TV advertisements and popular music to comment 
on mass culture.101 
By removing a found object from its original context and placing it in a 
new one, fresh meaning and purpose can be brought to the object.  As one 
Survey respondent noted, “I’m following the example of Girl Talk,102 where 
the sample is used to create something entirely different.”  Sampling, too, can 
bring attention to overlooked aspects of the original material.  For example, 
some musicians “use a sound like a snare or a kick drum that no one else may 
even notice in a recording.”103  At the same time, some objects may be used 
because they are laden with existing meaning and the artist wants to criticize 
that meaning.104 
Collage can be used to compare and contrast.105  Collage artist Bill Zindel 
is motivated by “the frictions and harmonies that occur when disparate ele-
ments – beautiful or dull, suggestive or meaningless – rub up against each other 
to make something new.”106  On the music side, Jay-Z took the sing-song, 
sweet child voices singing “It’s the Hard Knock Life” from the musical Annie 
and mixed in his rapped harsh lyrics about ghetto life.107  While at first “Hard 
Knock Life (Ghetto Anthem)” may seem like a contrast, it ultimately is a com-
parison between kids growing up in the ghetto and kids living in an orphanage. 
Another reason to sample and create appropriation art is to challenge the 
very idea of originality and the notion of authorship.  This is one of the moti-
vations for Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans series in which she re-photo-
graphed Depression era photographs that Walker Evans had taken for the Farm 
 
 98. Estate of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 915–16 (E.D. La. 2017). 
 99. Rebick, supra note 58, at 279. 
 100. Miwon Kwon, A Message from Barbara Kruger: Empathy Can Change the 
World, in MASHUP: THE BIRTH OF MODERN CULTURE, supra note 23, at 125. 
 101. Rebick, supra note 58, at 280. 
 102. Girl Talk is the stage name of disc jockey Gregg Gillis whose works are largely 
created from the mashups of samples from other artists’ music.  Rob Walker, Mash-up 
Model, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 20, 2008, at 15. 
 103. Susan Butler, Court Ruling Could Chill Sample Use, BILLBOARD, Sept. 16, 
2004, at 1. 
 104. Grenville, supra note 27, at 33. 
 105. Some Survey respondents reported using samples to “create comparisons of 
various performances of the same composition for educational ideas and performance 
practice.” 
 106. Krysa, supra note 43, at 309. 
 107. See Jay-Z, Hard Knock Life (Ghetto Anthem), on VOL. 2 . . . HARD KNOCK LIFE 
(Roc-a-Fella 1998); see also JAY-Z, DECODED 240 (2010). 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/6
2019] DIGITAL SAMPLING V. APPROPRIATION ART 383 
Security Administration.108  “Postmodern art like rap . . . show[s] that borrow-
ing and creation are not at all incompatible.  It further suggests that the appar-
ently original work of art is itself always a product of unacknowledged bor-
rowings . . . .”109  Collage has long been recognized as a legitimate art form in 
the visual arts, and it should be similarly respected in the music world. 
II. SAMPLING AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
This Part will explore the copyright law principles that come into play 
when an artist samples.  Sometimes an artist samples his or her own material.110  
Other times, an artist incorporates materials that are in the public domain111 or 
are freely usable pursuant to a Creative Commons license.112  These foregoing 
situations do not give rise to copyright problems.  However, when artists sam-
ple materials that are copyrighted, the legal problems begin. 
A. Copyrights in Music and Art 
Music and visual art, including photographs, drawings, paintings, and 
sculpture, are all subject to protection under the Copyright Act.113  With respect 
to music, there are two separate copyrights.114  There is a copyright in the mu-
sical work, which is the underlying composition that consists of things such as 
the lyrics, melody, harmony, rhythm, and arrangement of the song but not the 
audible form.115  Additionally, there is a copyright in the sound recording, 
which is the sound that is fixed in the recording whether it be a vinyl record, 
CD, cassette tape, or digital file.116  The sound recording copyright protects the 
 
 108. Grenville, supra note 27, at 33. 
 109. Shusterman, supra note 80, at 617. 
 110. Some Survey respondents noted self-sampling. 
 111. Some respondents use samples in the public domain and samples “recorded in 
1910.” 
 112. One respondent said, “I choose to only sample work which has been offered 
under clear Creative Commons licensing by the original artists.” 
 113. In the nomenclature of the Copyright Act, visual art fits into the category of 
“pictorial graphic, and sculptural” works of authorship.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2018).  
The Copyright Act defines this category to include “two-dimensional and three-dimen-
sional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, 
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural 
plans.”  Id. §101. 
 114. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2018) (protecting musical works), with id. § 
102(a)(7) (protecting sound recordings).  See also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the 
Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 475 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Sound recordings and their un-
derlying musical compositions are separate works with their own distinct copyrights”). 
 115. Still N the Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d at 475 n.3. 
 116. See Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 
412–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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musical performance and audio sound of the recording of the song.117  Sound 
recordings did not receive federal copyright protection until the advent of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, which protects sound recordings fixed on or after Feb-
ruary 15, 1972.118  Pre-1972 sound recordings had no federal copyright protec-
tion until the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act went 
into effect on October 11, 2018.119 
The copyrights in the musical work and the sound recording are typically 
owned by different parties.  The authors of musical works are generally the 
songwriters, composers, and lyricists.120  However, they often assign portions 
of their copyrights to third-party music publishers who promote and license the 
compositions.121  The authors of sound recordings are usually the singers, band 
members, and producers who are featured in the recording.122  Generally, either 
by contract or assignment, the copyrights in the sound recording are owned by 
the record label, which typically finances, promotes, and arranges for the dis-
tribution of the recording.123 
Copyright holders enjoy certain exclusive rights, such as the right to re-
produce and distribute the work, prepare derivative works, and publicly display 
their copyrighted works.124  Musical work copyright holders also have the right 
to perform the musical work publicly.125  A copyright holder of a sound record-
ing receives rights that are more limited than those of other creators.  Notably, 
the exclusive right of public performance is limited to digital audio transmis-
sions,126 and the exclusive right of reproduction is limited to the right to dupli-
cate the sounds in a form “that directly or indirectly recaptures the actual 
sounds fixed in the recording.”127  This means that anyone is free to imitate the 
sounds in the copyrighted work.128  While you cannot bootleg or make pirated 
 
 117. See id. 
 118. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936, 939 (N.Y. 2016). 
 119. See Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17, 19, and 28 
U.S.C.). 
 120. In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 121. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 19 (2015). 
 122. In re Cellco,  663 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
 123. COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 121, at 22. 
 124. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . musical arrangement . 
. . sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”). 
 125. Id. § 106(4). 
 126. Id. § 106(6). 
 127. Id. § 114(b). 
 128. See H. REP. NO. 94-1476 (Sept. 3, 1976); see also Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 
Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1986) (recognizing district court’s granting of summary 
judgment because “defendants had not violated the Act because the legislative history 
makes clear that deliberate imitation does not contravene the limited protection ex-
tended to recordings”); Erickson v. Blake, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 n.3 (D. Or. 2012) 
14
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copies of the latest Adele CD, you can use your own voice and instruments to 
try to duplicate the sounds of that CD without permission from the sound re-
cording holder.129  However, you will need to obtain permission from the mu-
sical composition copyright holders.130 
Based on the foregoing, someone who samples another musical or visual 
artist potentially violates that person’s exclusive rights to reproduce his or her 
work and to make derivative works.131  The copyright owner’s rights to distri-
bution and display also are potentially implicated. 
B. Copyright Infringement and the De Minimis Doctrine 
To establish a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove 
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of 
the work that are original.”132  “Not all copying . . . is copyright infringement,” 
especially if what is copied is not original or not a protectable element.133  For 
example, a single common chord by itself may not be considered original 
enough to be worthy of copyright protection.134 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “the 
venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex (‘the law cares not for trifles’) is 
part of the established background of legal principles against which all enact-
ments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are 
deemed to accept.”135  As Judge Learned Hand observed, “Even where there is 
some copying, that fact is not conclusive of infringement.  Some copying is 
permitted.  In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been done to 
an unfair extent.”136  In the copyright context, the de minimis doctrine comes 
 
(“[A] copyright in a sound recording only protects against a direct duplication of that 
recording.”). 
 129. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 768 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008) (explaining that § 144(b) “expressly disallows any recourse for a sound-
alike recording of a song”); Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142 n.14 (E.D. 
Wash. 2005) (stating a sound recording copyright is not violated where a party attempts 
to imitate the recording). 
 130. See New Old Music Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
 131. Williams v. Broadus, No. 99 Civ. 10957 MBM, 2001 WL 984714, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001); see also Range Road Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 
668 F.3d 1148, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2012) (sampling may violate a copyright holder’s 
exclusive right to create derivative works). 
 132. Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004, 2014 WL 7877773, 
*16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 
 135. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992) 
(alteration in original). 
 136. W. Publ’g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). 
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into play in three different ways: (1) as an “independent defense to infringe-
ments of little importance”; (2) as a part of the substantial similarity analysis 
discussed below; and (3) as a part of the fair use analysis, which is discussed 
in Section C.137 
Under the second prong of the test for copyright infringement, the plain-
tiff also must show that the defendant actually copied the plaintiff’s work and 
that there is substantial similarity between the protectable material in the plain-
tiff’s work and the defendant’s work.138  There are several tests to determine 
whether substantial similarity exists.139  Under the ordinary observer test, there 
is substantial similarity when “an average lay observer would recognize the 
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”140  In 
music copyright infringement cases, the “ordinary observer” is the listener and 
the test requires proof that the “defendant took from [the] plaintiff’s works so 
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience 
for whom such . . . music is composed, [and] that [the] defendant wrongfully 
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”141 
In digital sampling cases, the “fragmented literal similarity test” often 
comes into play because there is a high degree of similarity between the works 
but the copying is limited.142  The Ninth Circuit in Newton v. Diamond ex-
plained this doctrine: 
Fragmented literal similarity exists where the defendant copies a por-
tion of the plaintiff’s work exactly or nearly exactly, without appropri-
ating the work’s overall essence or structure.  Because the degree of 
similarity is high in such cases, the dispositive question is whether the 
copying goes to trivial or substantial elements.  Substantiality is meas-
ured by considering the qualitative and quantitative significance of the 
copied portion in relation to the plaintiff’s work as a whole.143 
 
 137. Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposal for Its Application in 
Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 945, 960 (2006); see also Sandoval v. New Line 
Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming grant of summary judgment 
to the defendant because the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s photographs in a movie 
was de minimis because it fell “below the quantitative threshold of substantial similar-
ity”). 
 138. Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 139. Id. at 139–40. 
 140. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. 
Fab–Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)). 
 141. TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (first 
alteration in original).  
 142. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The practice of 
music sampling will often present cases where the degree of similarity is high.  Indeed, 
unless the sample has been altered or digitally manipulated, it will be identical to the 
sampled portion of the original recording.”). 
 143. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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“[A] use is de minimis only if the average audience would not recognize 
the appropriation.”144 
In sampling cases, actual copying is rarely an issue.145  Most samplers 
readily concede to taking the material and in many instances the copying is 
“blatantly apparent.”146  Instead, the focus in most sampling cases is on whether  
(1) the copying is de minimis, meaning that it is “a technical violation of a right 
so trivial that the law will not impose legal consequences”;147 (2) the “copying 
has occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative threshold 
of substantial similarity”;148 or (3) the copying is fair use. 
C. Fair Use 
Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement that permits the use of 
copyrighted work without authorization in certain instances.149  The doctrine 
of fair use is necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, which is “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”150  Under the fair use doc-
trine, which is codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act, use of a copyrighted 
work is permitted for such purposes as criticism, comment, teaching, news re-
porting, scholarship, and research.151  Section 107 balances “the interest of au-
thors in the control and exploitation of their [works], and society’s competing 
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce . . . .”152 
Section 107 “provides an illustrative – but not exhaustive – list of fac-
tors”153 for determining fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 
 144. Id. at 1193. 
 145. See, e.g., Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 289 (D.N.J. 1993) (“The 
instant case is one of those rare cases in which such indirect proof is not necessary.  In 
this case, the defendants actually took a sample of plaintiff’s recording and incorporated 
into their recordings.  Indeed, they admit as much and admit that it was without author-
ization.”). 
 146. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 147. Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965, 969–70 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
 152. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 153. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.154 
In each fair use case, all four statutory factors must be examined and the 
results evaluated together in light of the purposes of copyright.155  “Because 
the defense of fair use is considered in its totality, the moving party is not re-
quired to prevail on every factor . . . .”156  The four statutory fair use factors are 
non-exclusive, and the “ultimate test of fair use . . .  is whether the copyright 
law’s goal of ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . . would 
be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.”157  Likewise, the 
examples of fair use enumerated in the preamble – criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research – are meant only to provide “gen-
eral guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most com-
monly had found to be fair uses.”158  They are not a restrictive list of permissi-
ble uses. 
The fair use test is meant to be a fluid and flexible approach with no 
bright-line rules.159  Instead, each case is analyzed on its own facts; therefore, 
the test is “context-sensitive.”160  This can lead to different judges construing 
and applying the statutory factors differently and coming up with disparate re-
sults in seemingly similar cases.  As a result, the fair use test is infamously 
unpredictable, which in turn leads to uncertainty and a fear of asserting it as a 
defense.  “For an artist engaged in remixing, each and every work used involves 
a high-stakes legal gamble.”161 
1. The First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu-
sic, Inc.162 shaped many of the modern-day principles of fair use and adopted 
the concept of transformative use, which comes into play under the first factor.  
At issue in Campbell was whether the rap group 2 Live Crew’s raunchy and 
unlicensed parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman” was copyright 
infringement or fair use.163  Although the district court had found it to be fair 
 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 155. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
 156. Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 145 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 157. Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 
1998) (citations omitted). 
 158. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78. 
 159. Id. at 577. 
 160. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 161. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 22–25. 
 162. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 163. Id. at 572–73. 
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use and granted summary judgment, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed and held that the “commercial nature” of the parody “rendered 
it presumptively unfair.”164  In reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
noted that whether the purpose of the work was commercial was just one ele-
ment under the first factor.165 
Although there is no specific mention of the “transformative” test in the 
language of § 107 itself,166 the Supreme Court in Campbell stated that deter-
mining “whether and to what extent the new work is transformative” is the 
“central purpose” of the first factor.167  This is a critical issue because “[t]he 
more the appropriator is using the copied material for new, transformative pur-
poses, the more it serves copyright’s goal of enriching public knowledge and 
the less likely it is that the appropriation will serve as a substitute for the orig-
inal or its plausible derivatives . . . .”168  The Supreme Court adopted the con-
cept of transformative use from the seminal law review article, Toward a Fair 
Use Standard, written by Judge Pierre N. Leval.169  As will be discussed below, 
“whether a work is transformative is a[n] often highly contentious topic.”170 
A new work is considered transformative if it “adds something new, with 
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”171  If the new work merely seeks to supersede the orig-
inal, it is not considered transformative.172  If 
the secondary use adds value to the original – if [copyrightable expres-
sion in the original work] is used as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and under-
standings – this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine 
intends to protect for the enrichment of society.173 
 
 164. Id. at 594. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that 
the transformative test is “not one of the statutory factors, though the Supreme Court 
mentioned it in Campbell” (citation omitted)). 
 167. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 168. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 169. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 170. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 171. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see also Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A use is considered transformative only 
where a defendant changes a plaintiff’s copyrighted work or uses the plaintiff’s copy-
righted work in a different context such that the plaintiff’s work is transformed into a 
new creation”). 
 172. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 173. Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 
1998) (alteration in original). 
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The more a new work comments on or critically refers back to an original 
work, the more likely it will be deemed transformative.174  There are no bright 
line rules for determining when something is transformative.175  Instead, it is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.176 
Whether the defendant’s use was for a nonprofit educational purpose, as 
opposed to a commercial purpose, is also relevant under the first factor.  The 
crux of this commercial/nonprofit distinction is “whether the user stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the custom-
ary price.”177  The fact that a use is for commercial purposes as opposed to 
nonprofit ones weighs against a finding of fair use.178  However, the more trans-
formative the new work, the less significant the commercialism.179 
Finally, under the first factor, some courts examine the defendant’s justi-
fication for the use.180  Courts often take into account whether the use is for 
one of the preamble reasons, such as criticism, news reporting, or teaching.181  
However, uses other than those enumerated in the preamble can be deemed 
fair.182  For example, many parodies are deemed fair use because the parody 
must be able to “‘conjure up’” enough of the original to “make the object of its 
critical wit recognizable.”183 
2. The Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second statutory factor “calls for recognition that some works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the conse-
quence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are 
copied.”184  Under this factor, creative works, such as visual arts, sound record-
ings, and musical compositions, merit stronger protection than informational 
or factual works.185  This means that this factor will generally weigh against 
fair use in a sampling case.186  However, “the second factor may be of limited 
 
 174. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
 175. See Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1175. 
 176. See id.  
 177. Harper & Row, Publ’rs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
 178. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 179. Id. at 710 (finding the commercialism of the use to “‘be of limited usefulness 
where,’ as here, ‘the creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.’”). 
 180. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 254–55 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 181. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). 
 182. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706. 
 183. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
 184. Id. at 586. 
 185. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (pho-
tographs are creative); Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 
751 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (musical compositions are creative). 
 186. See Estate of Smith, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 751. 
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usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for a transformative 
purpose.”187 
Also, the second factor considers whether a work has been published.188  
Use of an unpublished work is less likely to be considered fair because it is 
believed that the law tends to favor allowing artists to control the first public 
appearance of their work.189 
3. The Third Factor: Amount and Substantiality 
The third statutory factor explores “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”190  The question 
is whether “the quantity and value of the materials used, . . . are reasonable in 
relation to the purpose of the copying.”191  In certain cases, use of the entire 
work may be necessary and thus justified as fair use.192  In other cases, just 
taking a small percentage of the work may be deemed infringing if what is 
taken goes to the heart of the work.193 
4. The Fourth Factor: The Effect Upon the Market 
The fourth and final statutory factor is “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”194  As a result of Camp-
bell, the emphasis started to shift away from the fourth factor, which was tra-
ditionally considered the most important,195 and towards the first factor and 
whether the new work was transformative.196  Recently, in some cases, the pen-
dulum has swung again towards considering the fourth factor to be “the single 
 
 187. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 
2006); see also Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. 
 188. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 189. Id. 
 190. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2018). 
 191. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (citation omit-
ted). 
 192. See Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2013) (find-
ing use of an entire illustration in the video backdrop of its stage show was fair use 
because the work was not “meaningfully divisible” and “the entire work was necessary 
to achieve Green Day’s ‘new expression, meaning or message.’”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (copying an entire photographic image was 
fair use in light of the purpose of a search engine). 
 193. See Harper & Row, Publ’rs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985). 
(no fair use where “the words actually quoted were an insubstantial portion” but were 
“essentially the heart of the book”). 
 194. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 195. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (“[The fourth factor] is the ‘most 
important, and indeed, central fair use factor.’”). 
 196. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; see also Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g 
Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The Supreme Court has recently retreated 
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most important element of fair use.”197  Under this factor, the court should con-
sider “the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged 
infringer [and] also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort 
engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact 
on the potential market for the original.”198  This factor weighs in favor of fair 
use when the allegedly infringing use does not substitute for the original and 
serves a different market function.199  Market harm may be presumed if the 
copying is done for commercial gain.  By their very nature, transformative 
works are less likely to have a negative impact on the potential market of the 
copyrighted work,200 and thus, market harm cannot be presumed. 
Also, under the fourth factor, the harm to the market for derivative works 
must be considered.  The emphasis should be on whether the secondary work 
usurps the market for the original work or its potential derivatives and not on 
whether it suppresses or destroys the market.201  “The market for potential de-
rivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in gen-
eral develop or license others to develop.”202 
III. DIGITAL MUSIC AND VISUAL ARTS SAMPLING COURT CASES 
This Part reviews the leading cases involving digital sampling and appro-
priation art.  The cases are broken into three time periods: (1) pre-Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,203 which is the Supreme Court’s seminal case on fair 
use; (2) post-Campbell and before the pivotal decision in Cariou v. Prince,204 
which expanded the definition of transformative in fair use cases; and (3) post-
Cariou, where courts are now grappling with how to apply this expanded doc-
trine of transformative use. 
 
from its earlier cases suggesting that the fourth statutory factor is the most important 
element of fair use . . . .”). 
 197. Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (quoting Harper & Row, Publ’rs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985)); see also Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 
2018); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We think 
it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most important usually is the fourth 
(market effect).”). 
 198. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (second alternation in original). 
 199. Sofa Ent., Inc. v. Dodger Prods., 709 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 200. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003); Castle Rock, 
150 F.3d at 145 (“The more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood that 
the secondary use substitutes for the original.”). 
 201. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 202. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 
 203. Id. at 569. 
 204. 714 F.3d 694. 
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A. The Early Years – Pre-Campbell 
The public at large was introduced to sampling in 1980 when “Rapper’s 
Delight” by Sugarhill Gang became a top forty hit on the Billboard Hot 100 
chart.205  The song sampled the instrumental introduction of Chic’s “Good 
Times,” which was composed by Bernard Edwards and Nile Rodgers.206  “Rap-
per’s Delight” was the first song that contained a sample to hit the Billboard 
chart.207  It also resulted in a legal dispute.  After Edwards and Rodgers threat-
ened a lawsuit, the issue was resolved by granting them a complete copyright 
in “Rapper’s Delight.”208 
As hip-hop grew in popularity in the 1980’s, additional lawsuits ensued, 
but the cases were settled before any legal judgments were issued.209  Legal 
commentators, too, began questioning the legality of sampling.210  In the ab-
sence of judicial guidance, cautious and prudent record companies and artists 
sought licenses for their samples.211  Others chose to forego permission.212  
There was neither a uniform business practice for sampling nor any clear legal 
authority on the issue.213  Then came Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner 
Brothers Records, Inc.214 
1. The First Digital Sampling Judicial Decision – Grand Upright Mu-
sic Limited v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc. 
With this 1991 decision concerning the rapper Biz Markie’s song “Alone 
Again,” the music industry seemingly got an answer to the question of the le-
gality of sampling: “‘Thou shalt not steal.’”215  Those were the opening words 
in Judge Duffy’s opinion.216  Citing no authority other than the Bible, Judge 
Duffy stated that the defendants’ unauthorized sampling constituted copyright 
 
 205. Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing . . . Oh My!: How Hip Hop 
Music is Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 843, 855 (2011). 
 206. Joo, supra note 52, at 427–28. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 130–31. 
 210. See, e.g., Johnson Okpaluba, Digital Sampling and Music Industry Practices, 
Re-Spun, in LAW AND CREATIVITY IN THE AGE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT FRANCHISE 75 
n.2 (2014). 
 211. See Joo, supra note 52, at 428–30; see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimen-
sion Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[M]any artists and record companies 
have sought licenses as a matter of course.”). 
 212. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 132. 
 213. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS & COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 134, 140–41 (2001). 
 214. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 215. Id. at 183. 
 216. See id.  
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infringement.217  Not only did Judge Duffy then grant the plaintiff’s motion for 
a preliminary injunction but he also referred the matter to the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York for criminal prosecution.218  
The legal analysis behind Judge Duffy’s opinion was scant.  There was no dis-
cussion of whether the defendants’ copying was an unlawful appropriation or 
whether it was fair use.219  After Judge Duffy’s scathing decision, the defend-
ants settled the case for a “substantial” sum.220  Biz Markie’s album was re-
called, and later versions deleted the song “Alone Again.”221 
The Grand Upright decision put the fear of God and copyright laws into 
sampling artists.  Many misunderstood the judge’s decision and took it to mean 
that any use of a sample required permission from the copyright holder.222  
However, that interpretation is legally wrong.  A closer inspection of the Grand 
Upright opinion and the background of the case shows that it is often cited out 
of context.  The issue in Grand Upright was Biz Markie’s unauthorized sample 
of the easy listening ballad “Alone Again (Naturally),” which was recorded 
and composed by Gilbert O’Sullivan.223  The sample consisted of three words 
from the song and eight bars of the music.224  Prior to the release of Biz 
Markie’s record, his attorney contacted O’Sullivan’s agent to obtain a license 
for the sample.225  While the request was pending, Cold Chillin’ Records, Inc. 
released Biz Markie’s album.226  O’Sullivan objected to the sampling and 
Grand Upright, of which O’Sullivan was the principal shareholder, sought a 
preliminary injunction against the defendants.227 
What is often missed in the legal commentary regarding this opinion is 
that the defendants seemed to have conceded that they needed a license.228  
There is no record that they asserted that the sampling was fair use.  Instead, 
the defendants argued that Grand Upright failed to prove that it owned the cop-
 
 217. See id.  
 218. Id. at 185. 
 219. See at 183–85. 
 220. Carl A. Falstrom, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner 
Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music, 45 
HASTINGS L. J. 359, 365–66 (1994). 
 221. Stephen Carlisle, Sounds Great! But It Sounds Very Familiar . . . Where to 
Draw the Line on Digital Sampling of Sound Recordings?, LANDSLIDE, May/June 2017, 
at 14. 
 222. See Ryan C. Grelecki, Comment, Can Law and Economics Bring the Funk . . 
. or Efficiency?: A Law and Economics Analysis of Digital Sampling, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. 
REV. 297, 318 (2005). 
 223. Grand Upright Music Ltd., 780 F. Supp. at 183. 
 224. Sheila Rule, Record Companies Are Challenging ‘Sampling’ in Rap, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 21, 1992, at C1. 
 225. Grand Upright Music Ltd., 780 F. Supp. at 184. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Joo, supra note 52, at 431–32. 
 228. See Grand Upright Music Ltd., 780 F. Supp. at 184. 
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/6
2019] DIGITAL SAMPLING V. APPROPRIATION ART 395 
yright to the composition and master recording of “Alone Again (Natu-
rally).”229  As the court saw it, ownership of the copyright was the only issue 
at stake because the defendants had admitted guilt as to the copyright infringe-
ment.230 
Had the defendants asserted a fair use defense, they probably would have 
had a strong case.  It could be argued that Biz Markie’s song was transforma-
tive because it added a new message and meaning to O’Sullivan’s introspective 
ballad about suicide, the loss of family, and being jilted at the altar.231  In con-
trast, “Markie’s song was about how the rapper received no respect as a per-
former back when he played in combos with old friends, but since he had be-
come a solo performer his career had been satisfying.”232  It is unlikely that 
Markie’s rap song would have had any impact on the potential market for 
O’Sullivan’s easy listening ballad.  As the court in Jarvis v. A & M Records 233 
noted, “The two songs were utterly unlike and reached completely different 
markets.  Certainly nobody would have confused the songs.  Few would have 
bought the rap song because it contained a portion of the original song.”  O’Sul-
livan did not license his songs for samples, so Markie was not usurping a de-
rivative market either.234 
Arguably this case should have little precedential value beyond its limited 
and unique facts, i.e., defendants who testified that they needed a license to 
sample and did not assert fair use in a preliminary injunction case.  Unfortu-
nately, probably because it was the first reported judicial decision dealing with 
music sampling, the opinion is rarely confined to this context and has resulted 
in the entrenched view that licenses are required for all music samples. It is 
often reported that, as a result of this case, record companies adopted strict 
licensing requirements and demanded that all samples be cleared.235 
In any event, Grand Upright was the first step in setting the music indus-
try on a different path than the art world.  Subsequent judges would follow 
Judge Duffy’s lead236 and proclaim, “There can be no more brazen stealing of 
music than digital sampling.”237 
 
 229. Id. at 183–84. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Gilbert O’Sullivan, Alone Again (Naturally) (MAM Music 1972); see also 
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 213, at 141. 
 232. Id. 
 233. 827 F. Supp. 282, 295 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 234. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 213, at 142. 
 235. Okpaluba, supra note 210, at 76. 
 236. Toho Co., LTD v. Priority Records, LLC, No. CV 01-04744-SVW, 2002 WL 
33840993, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2002) (“Digital sampling without permission has 
been held repeatedly to constitute copyright infringement”). 
 237. Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 295 (D.N.J. 1993). 
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2. The First Visual Arts Sampling Judicial Decision – The Jeff Koons 
“Banality” Cases 
The first visual arts sampling case to go to court238 was also met with 
righteous indignation and outrage.239  In 1988, appropriation artist Jeff Koons’ 
“Banality Show” at the Sonnabend Gallery in New York resulted in a series of 
copyright infringement lawsuits being filed against him in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.240  The theme of the exhibit was 
“banality,” and Koons focused on “popular attitudes toward objects and facts 
of everyday life which were commonplace.”241  For the exhibition, Koons took 
images that he had collected, such as note cards242 and a Garfield comic strip,243 
and re-contextualized them into sculptures.244  While many of these images 
were copyrighted, Koons did not seek permission to use them.245 
On the one hand, the show was a success, with many of the sculptures 
selling in excess of $100,000.246  On the other hand, the show also resulted in 
three lawsuits being filed against Koons, which were not successful for him.  
In all three of the cases, the plaintiffs filed summary judgment motions on their 
copyright infringement claims against Koons, and Koons contended that the 
sculptures were protected under the fair use doctrine as parodies.  In all three 
cases, Koons lost. 
The first of the lawsuits to result in a judicial opinion was Rogers v. 
Koons,247  and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was later upheld 
on appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which called 
Koons’ actions “piracy” and plagiarism.248  The case stemmed from Koons’ 
appropriation of Art Rogers’ black and white photograph called “Puppies,” 
 
 238. Prior to this, Andy Warhol also had been sued for copyright infringement for 
using other artists’ works in his pieces.  However, he chose to settle those lawsuits 
before judicial opinions were reached.  Thereafter, Warhol sought licenses when using 
copyrighted materials.  BOLLIER, supra note 32, at 48–55. 
 239. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In short, it is not 
really the parody flag that appellants are sailing under, but rather the flag of piracy.”). 
 240. Id. at 304–05; United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 1, 1993). 
 241. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 372. 
 242. See Campbell v. Koons, 1993 WL 97381, at *2 (where Koons used a note card 
containing a photograph of boys and a pig). 
 243. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 375. 
 244. Id. at 372. 
 245. Id. at 373. 
 246. Campbell, 1993 WL 97381, at *5 (the four pieces sold for a total of 
$323,466.25); United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 379 (two of the four 
sculptures sold for $125,000 a piece); see also VILIS R. INDE, ART IN THE COURTROOM 
11 (1998) (show generated almost seven million dollars). 
 247. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 248. Id. at 311. 
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which depicted a couple sitting on a bench and holding eight German Shepherd 
puppies.249  There really was no issue that Koons had directly set out to copy 
“Puppies” when creating his “String of Puppies” sculpture.250  The small 
changes that Koons had made – adding flowers to the hair of the couple and 
giving the puppies bulbous noses – did not alter the finding of substantial sim-
ilarity.251 
The main issue was whether Koons’ copying of “Puppies” constituted fair 
use.252  The court went through each of the statutory factors and found none of 
them favored Koons.253  Most of the discussion was devoted to the first factor, 
the purpose and character of the use, and whether Koons’ use was a parody.254  
Koons argued that his sculpture was a parody of “society at large” as opposed 
to the “Puppies” sculpture itself.255  The court held that in order for a new work 
to be considered a parody, the “copied work must be, at least in part, an object 
of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the original 
work.”256  Since materialistic society, as opposed to the “Puppies” photograph, 
was the object of Koons’ parody, the copying of “Puppies” was not fair use.257  
The court also rejected Koons’ argument that his copying was fair use because 
he was “acting within an artistic tradition of commenting upon the common-
place.”258 
The court had other reasons for finding against Koons under the first fac-
tor.  The court held that Koons acted in bad faith when he tore off the copyright 
notice on the “Puppies” notecard before sending it to his artisans to use as a 
model for the sculpture.259  Under the first factor, “Knowing exploitation of a 
copyrighted work for personal gain militates against a finding of fair use.”260  
The court also noted Koons’ hefty profit from the sales of the sculpture.261  
While Koons’ profit-making motive was not controlling by itself, it cut against 
a finding of fair use when considered with the other factors.262 
The other statutory factors did not support a finding of fair use by Koons.  
The nature of the copyrighted work “Puppies” was creative and imaginative, 
which favored Rogers.263  Under the third factor, the court held that Koons’ 
 
 249. Id. at 304. 
 250. Id. at 305. 
 251. Id. at 308. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 309–12. 
 254. See id. at 309–10. 
 255. Id. at 309. 
 256. Id. at 310. 
 257. Id. at 309. 
 258. Id. at 310. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 309. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 310. 
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“nearly in toto” copying exceeded the permissible level under fair use espe-
cially because Koons’ sculpture was not a parody.264  Finally, because Koons’ 
use of “Puppies” was commercial in nature, the court presumed there would be 
future harm to the market for “Puppies.”265  In particular, Rogers would be 
unable to sell the derivative right to make a sculpture.266  Also, photographs of 
the “String of Puppies” sculpture would compete against the “Puppies” note-
cards.267 
After finding Koons liable for copyright infringement, the court awarded 
Rogers damages and ordered Koons to turn over the infringing sculptures.268  
At least Koons can be thankful that the court did not refer the matter to the 
district attorney for criminal prosecution.269 
The decision in Rogers then set off a domino effect.  The judges in the 
other “Banality” cases largely followed the court’s reasoning in Rogers and 
held that Koons’ “Banality” sculptures did not constitute fair use because they 
were not parodies.270  For example, the court in Campbell v. Koons271 held that 
the “Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Koons also forecloses, as a matter 
of law, Koons’ asserted affirmative defenses of Fair Use and Parody and there-
fore they need not hardly be discussed . . . .”272 
After the decisions in Grand Upright and the Koons’ “Banality” cases, 
unlicensed art and digital music sampling both seemed doomed to fail under 
 
 264. Id. at 311. 
 265. Id. at 312. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 312–13. 
 269. However, the Second Circuit did admonish Koons for his “willful and egre-
gious behavior” and advised Rogers that he was “a good candidate for enhanced statu-
tory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)” because of Koons’ conduct.  Id. at 
313. 
 270. In rejecting Koons’ fair use defense in United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. 
Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 387–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the court under both the first and 
fourth factors largely focused on the commercial nature of Koons’ “high-priced art” 
and the fact that Koons intended to profit from the sale of the “Wild Boy and Puppy” 
sculptures.  Id.  The second fair use factor also did not favor Koons because the fictional 
cartoon “Odie” clearly was a creative character.  Id. at 380.  The third factor, too, 
worked against Koons because he had copied “Odie” in its entirety.  Id. at 381.  Finally, 
under the fourth factor, which the court considered to be the most important, the court 
held that market harm to the “Odie” character could be presumed because of the pri-
marily commercial nature of Koons’ work and UFS frequently licensed the character 
“Odie.”  Id. at 382. 
 271. No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993).  The only 
issue left for the court to decide was whether it mattered that Koons did not copy certain 
elements from the photograph.  The court quickly dispensed with that argument noting 
that Koons had taken the heart of the photograph which was the boy pushing the pig.  
Id. at *8. 
 272. Id. at *3. 
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the fair use test.  But, in 1994, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.273 adopting Judge Leval’s transformative use 
doctrine.  As explained in Part II, this would change how courts analyze fair 
use and more emphasis would be placed on whether the allegedly infringing 
work “add[ed] something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message”274 rather than 
whether the allegedly infringing work was of a commercial nature.275 
B. The Post-Campbell Cases 
Given that Campbell involved a rap parody, it might be expected that the 
music world would embrace Campbell’s concept of transformativeness as a 
means to find digital sampling fair use.276  Not so.  By 2005, the paths of digital 
and art sampling cases firmly diverged.  The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport Music, 
Inc. v. Dimension Films277 took music in a different direction as to the de min-
imis doctrine, and it frightened musical artists away from unauthorized sam-
pling.  In contrast, in Blanch v. Koons,278 which again involved the appropria-
tion artist Jeff Koons, the Second Circuit seized upon Campbell’s definition of 
transformativeness to find fair use in a non-parody collage case, which em-
boldened other appropriation artists such as Richard Prince. 
1. The De Minimis Doctrine and Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films 
The applicability of the de minimis doctrine to musical compositions was 
first recognized in 2003 in Newton v. Diamond,279  wherein the jazz flutist and 
composer James W. Newton sued the rap group the Beastie Boys.  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the Beastie Boy’s use of a three-note segment of Newton’s 
composition was de minimis and did not infringe his copyright.280  The three-
note sequence appeared only once in Newton’s composition, and therefore, a 
reasonable juror could not find it to be quantitatively or qualitatively significant 
 
 273. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 274. Id. at 579. 
 275. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 715, 734 (2011) (“[T]he transformative use paradigm, as adopted in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose overwhelmingly drives fair use analysis in the courts today.”). 
 276. It should be noted the United States Supreme Court ultimately did not decide 
whether 2 Live Crew’s parody was fair use.  Instead, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision, which had held that the “commercial nature” of the parody 
“rendered it presumptively unfair,” and remanded the case to the district court “for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with [its] opinion.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594. 
 277. See 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 278. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 279. 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 280. Id. at 1196–97. 
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to the composition as a whole.281  However, because the defendants had ob-
tained a license to sample the sound recording in Newton, the case left open the 
issue of whether the de minimis doctrine also applied to sound recordings.282 
Two years later, in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,283 the 
Sixth Circuit took a bold stance on this issue by adopting a “bright-line” rule 
as to sound recordings: “Get a license or do not sample.”284  The Sixth Circuit 
admittedly was creating a new rule that the de minimis doctrine does not apply 
to sound recordings, and in effect it rejected the substantial similarity test as to 
sound recordings.285  Instead, the court held that all copying of sound record-
ings, no matter how quantitatively or qualitatively trivial, are actionable.286  
This included the two-second snippet at issue in the case.287  The court prem-
ised its new theory on its reading of the copyright statute itself and on public 
policy grounds.288 
The court’s analysis began with examining the statutory text of § 114(b) 
of the Copyright Act, which applies solely to sound recordings and is intended 
to clarify and limit the scope of protection for sound recordings found in               
§ 106.289  Section 114(b) states: 
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording un-
der clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or 
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an inde-
pendent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or 
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.290 
The purpose of § 114(b) is to shield certain conduct from infringement.291  
As discussed in Part II, § 114(b) permits tribute bands to recreate and imitate 
their favorite songs without permission from the copyright holder in the sound 
recording as long as the tribute band uses its own instruments and vocals to do 
so.292  These type of recordings are known as “sound-alikes.”293  By protecting 
 
 281. Id. at 1195. 
 282. See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 283. 410 F.3d 792, 801–02 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 284. Id. at 801. 
 285. Id. at 801–02. 
 286. Id. at 797–98. 
 287. Id. at 796. 
 288. Id.  
 289. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2018). 
 290. Id. 
 291. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 807–08 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 292. See supra text accompanying notes 127–30. 
 293. In re Simitar Ent., Inc., 275 B.R. 331, 337 n.2 (D. Minn. 2002)) (defining a 
sound-alike as “being recorded via an intentionally-close mimicking of the vocal and 
instrumental style of the releasing artist” generally by “performers as-yet unblessed 
with fame”). 
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sound-alike recordings from liability, § 114(b) in effect serves as a limitation 
on the exclusive rights of sound recording copyright holders. 
The Sixth Circuit, however, treats § 114(b) as actually expanding the 
rights of a sound recording copyright holder.  Since there is no liability when 
the sounds are entirely original, the court surmised that the reverse must be 
true, i.e., liability must automatically exist whenever some of the sounds are 
not independently fixed but rather are copied.  Based on § 114(b)’s phrase “en-
tirely of an independent fixation of other sounds,” the court inferred that cop-
yright holders have the exclusive right to sample their own recordings.294  It 
then surmised that with respect to sound recordings, there is “no de minimis 
taking” and “substantial similarity [does] not enter the equation” when analyz-
ing the sampling.295 
By eliminating the de minimis exception as to sound recordings, the Sixth 
Circuit granted broader rights to sound recording copyright holders than other 
types of copyright owners.  Yet, when Congress first provided sound record-
ings with copyright protection in 1971,296 Congress made crystal clear that 
“this limited copyright [does] not grant any broader rights than are accorded to 
other copyright proprietors under the existing title 17.”297  Even though the 
Supreme Court has cautioned courts to be “reluctan[t] to expand the protections 
afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance,”298 the Sixth 
Circuit nonetheless carved out a class of copyright holders who would receive 
greater protection with immunity from the de minimis doctrine.  If Congress 
did intend to grant broader exclusive rights for sound recordings, then seem-
ingly it should have done this through the “‘copyright-granting’ statutory pro-
visions of . . . § 106,” not through the limitation section in § 114(b).299 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit did not bother with the legislative history of 
§ 114 because digital musical sampling was not being done when the Copyright 
Act was drafted.300  Yet, Professor David Nimmer, the leading commentator 
on copyright law, has stated, 
Congress explicitly noted in that context that “infringement takes place 
whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to 
make up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in phonorecords 
by repressing, transcribing, recapturing off the air, or any other method 
 
 294. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(emphasis in original). 
 295. Id. at 801.  
 296. Sound Recordings Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 3, 85 Stat. 391, 391 (1971) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (2018)). 
 297. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971); see also S. REP. NO. 92-72 at 3 (1971) (“The 
purpose of the new [statutory language] is to extend to the owners of copyrighted music 
used in the making of recordings the same remedies available for other copyright in-
fringements . . . .”). 
 298. Sony Corp., v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 
 299. Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 300. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 805. 
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. . . .”  That excerpt debunks the court’s imputation that Congress, when 
adopting section 114, intended to dispense with traditional notions of 
substantial similarity.301 
Notably, Congress did not express an intent to find infringement where 
an insubstantial or de minimis portion of the actual sounds are reproduced.302 
The Sixth Circuit also set forth a number of policy justifications for its 
interpretation, including ease of enforcement of a bright-line rule303 and judi-
cial economy.304  The court was not concerned about stifling creativity because 
it reasoned that musicians could always duplicate the sounds of the sample by 
playing their own instruments and this factor would keep the cost of the license 
under control.305  The court also rationalized that sampling of a sound recording 
is always done intentionally and is always taking “something of value” because 
it is a physical taking.306 
The Sixth Circuit’s pronouncement that its rule would not stifle creativ-
ity307 has been proven wrong.  It has been shown that post-Bridgeport, songs 
lack densely-layered samples.308  This is because it would be too costly to clear 
all of the samples used in albums such as Paul’s Boutique and Fear of a Black 
Planet.309  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit wrongfully assumed that artists sam-
ple in order to reduce costs and avoid the labor of having to create their own 
music.310  For many artists, the whole purpose of sampling is to use the original 
sound recording, whether it be for commentary or to bring attention to old mu-
sic.311  In some instances, it is necessary for musicians to use the original sound 
recording because the sounds cannot be recreated for “a variety of reasons: 
recording studios were set up differently in the old days, the machines used 
were different and gave a particular characteristic, the sample contains the 
 
 301. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][b] (2018) (footnotes omitted) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976)); see also EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Me-
dia Corp., No. 601209, 2008 WL 5027245, at *6–8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) (quot-
ing and expressly rejecting Bridgeport’s analysis). 
 302. Id. at *5. 
 303. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 799. 
 304. Id. at 802. 
 305. Id. at 801. 
 306. Id. at 801–02. 
 307. See id. at 801. 
 308. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 188; see also MICHAEL HELLER, THE 
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS 
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 13–16 (2008). 
 309. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 207–08 (showing that re-releasing 
Paul’s Boutique would result in a loss of almost $20 million to the record label and re-
releasing Public Enemy’s Fear of a Black Planet would result in a loss of over $6 mil-
lion). 
 310. See Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 799 n.7. 
 311. See supra discussion in Section II.C. 
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voice of a particular person.”312  The court also failed to recognize that other 
types of artistic sampling also are done intentionally and take something of 
value and yet are not subject to bright-line prohibition rules.313 
Legal scholars314 and district courts in other circuits 315 were quick to crit-
icize the decision in Bridgeport.  However, the decision caused record labels 
to demand that all samples, no matter how small, be cleared.316  Although the 
Sixth Circuit asserted that the music industry would “work out guidelines, in-
cluding a fixed schedule of license fees,” to deal with samples, this did not 
happen.317  Licensing fees can be exorbitant and negotiations for licenses can 
often be complex and time-consuming, especially with respect to musical com-
positions, which usually have multiple owners.318  If an artist cannot afford the 
license or the original artist denies the use of the sample, the song or the sample 
must be aborted.  In response, some artists choose to forgo all sampling.  Others 
 
 312. Shun-Ling Chen, Sampling as a Secondary Orality Practice and Copyright’s 
Technological Biases, 17 J. HIGH TECH. L. 206, 257 (2017). 
 313. Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that the defendants’ deliberate use of the plaintiff’s photographs in the background 
of a movie fell below the quantitative threshold of substantial similarity and was de 
minimis); see also Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (describing the 
defendant artist Richard Prince who tore out photographs from the plaintiff’s book to 
create his collage works). 
 314. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 301, § 13.03[A][2][b]; see also Jennifer 
R.R. Mueller, All Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films and De Minimis 
Digital Sampling, 81 IND. L. J. 435, 442 (2006) (“The Bridgeport court’s fundamental 
misinterpretation of the law is contrary to all relevant case law, statutory language, and 
legislative history . . . .”); Mike Suppappola, Confusion in the Digital Age: Why the De 
Minimis Use Test Should be Applied to Digital Samples of Copyrighted Sound Record-
ings, 14 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 93, 117 (2006) (finding the Bridgeport decision was 
illogical and contrary to § 114’s legislative history); 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:61 
(2011) (describing Bridgeport Music as “disturbing,” “inexplicable,” and a misunder-
standing of the U.S. Copyright Act’s structure). 
 315. See, e.g., Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1330–40 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009) (rejecting Bridgeport’s rule); Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, No. 179, 2014 
WL 12591933, at *8 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“declin[ing] to follow the per se infringe-
ment analysis from Bridgeport” because Bridgeport “has been criticized by courts and 
commentators alike”); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 (E.D. La. 2014) (find-
ing “it is far from clear” that Bridgeport’s rule should apply in the face of harsh judicial 
criticism); Pryor v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., No. CV13-04344, 2014 WL 
2812309, at *7 n.3 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2014) (declining to apply Bridgeport’s rule); 
EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., No. 601209, 2008 WL 5027245, at *6–8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) (declining “to follow the statutory interpretation of section 
114 relied upon by the court in Bridgeport Music”); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 
824 F.3d 871, 885–87 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting Bridgeport’s holding). 
 316. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 192. 
 317. 410 F.3d 792, 804 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 318. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 207–08; see also Brown v. Columbia 
Recording Corp., 03 Civ. 6570 (DAB)(KNF), 2006 WL 3616966, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 
24, 2006) (describing licensing process and rates). 
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choose to use fewer samples.  Thus, creativity is stifled, the progress of arts is 
stunted, and society as a whole loses cultural resources. 
2. Blanch v. Koons 
After a string of losses in the Southern District of New York and the Sec-
ond Circuit, Koons finally won one in Blanch v. Koons.319  In that case, Koons 
appropriated a photograph by the professional fashion photographer Andrea 
Blanch to create his collage painting “Niagara.”320  “Niagara” was a part of the 
“Easyfun-Ethereal” paintings series, all of which were collages consisting of 
fragmentary images that Koons had collected from fashion magazines and ad-
vertisements.321  “Niagara” was the only one that sparked a lawsuit.  The pho-
tograph at issue, “Silk Sandals by Gucci,” was part of a six-page feature in 
Allure magazine.322  Koons scanned the image into his computer and then al-
tered parts of it to incorporate into “Niagara” along with a number of other 
images.323  Upon being sued for copyright infringement, Koons once again ar-
gued fair use.324  This time the defense worked.  The district court granted 
Koons and the other defendants summary judgment because it found Koons’ 
new work to be transformative and thus fair use.325  The Second Circuit af-
firmed on appeal.326 
Why was the outcome in Blanch different than the outcomes in Rogers 
and the other “Banality” cases?  There are a variety of reasons.  However, the 
different outcome can largely be ascribed to the Supreme Court’s watershed 
decision in Campbell that had come down in 1994 in-between the decisions of 
Rogers and Blanch.  Campbell changed the Second Circuit’s fair use analysis 
in Rogers and Blanch in several ways.  To begin, the most important of the 
statutory factors was no longer the fourth factor like it was in Rogers.327  In-
stead, in Blanch, the focus shifted to the first factor, which – according to the 
Supreme Court in Campbell – was now the heart of the fair use inquiry.328  The 
analysis of the sub-factors (i.e., transformativeness, commercial use, bad faith, 
and justification for the use) under the first factor also changed.329  No longer 
was commercial use the starting point.  In Blanch, the court first looked at 
 
     319. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 320. Id. at 247. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 247–48. 
 323. Id. at 248. 
 324. Id. at 249. 
 325. Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 480–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 326. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259. 
 327. See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
1, 1993); see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 328. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259. 
 329. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251–56. 
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whether Koons’ use was transformative.330  It then examined whether Koons’ 
use was commercial.331 
By far, the examination of whether Koons’ work was transformative was 
the biggest change.  Although Judge Leval had articulated his transformative 
test at the time Rogers was decided, the Supreme Court had not yet embraced 
it.  Therefore, there was no discussion as to whether the “String of Puppies” 
transformed “Puppies.”  If Koons wanted the first factor to go his way in Rog-
ers, he had to categorize his work as a parody.332  In Blanch, this was no longer 
necessary.  A work did not have to be parody to be transformative.333  Instead, 
the court deemed “Niagara” to be transformative because Koons’ “purposes in 
using Blanch’s image are sharply different from Blanch’s goals in creating 
it.”334  While Blanch “wanted to show some sort of erotic sense,”335 Koons 
used the image for “fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic con-
sequences of mass media.”336 
As to the commercial nature of “Niagara,” Koons made a significant 
profit from its sale just like Koons made a substantial profit from the sales of 
his sculptures in Rogers.337  However, creation and exhibition of “Niagara” 
could not be “described as commercial exploitation.”338  Meanwhile, the court 
in Rogers did not appreciate that Koons’ work could have benefits beyond his 
own profits.339 
The propriety of Koons’ actions in using the copyrighted images also 
made a difference in the outcomes of Blanch and Rogers.  In Rogers, the court 
found bad faith because Koons had torn off the copyright notice on Rogers’ 
image.340  There was no such bad faith conduct in Blanch.341  Just using a cop-
yrighted image without permission did not constitute bad faith by itself.342 
 
 330. Id. at 251. 
 331. Id. at 253. 
 332. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. 
 333. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255 (“We have applied Campbell in too many non-parody 
cases to require citation for the proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are 
not limited to cases involving parody.”). 
 334. Id. at 252. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 253.  In determining that Koons’ use of “Silk Sandals” was transforma-
tive, the court also noted the “changes of its colors, the background against which it is 
portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details and, cru-
cially, their entirely different purpose and meaning – as part of a massive painting com-
missioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space.”  Id. 
 337. Id.  
 338. Id. at 256. 
 339. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311–12 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 340. Id. at 309. 
 341. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255–56. 
 342. Id.  
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The amount that Koons copied under the third factor also affected the 
decisions in Rogers and Blanch.  In Rogers, Koons “slavishly recreated” Rog-
ers’ image.343  In contrast, in Blanch, Koons took the legs, feet, and sandals 
from “Silk Sandals,” ignoring many of the other key features of the photograph 
including the airplane cabin setting.344  The court deemed this to be a reasona-
ble amount in relation to his purpose of evoking “a certain style of mass com-
munication.”345 
Finally, the fourth factor made a difference to the outcome in Blanch.  
Unlike Rogers, who derived a part of his income from licensing his photo-
graphs, including “Puppies,” Blanch never licensed any of her photographs for 
use in visual art.346  Thus, Koons’ use of “Silk Sandals” did not affect the po-
tential market for or value of that work.347 
An argument could be made that the outcome in Rogers would have been 
different if the court had analyzed Koons’ use under the transformative test.  
Koons’ purpose in using “Puppies” was to provide a “fair social criticism” and 
to show that “the mass production of commodities and media images has 
caused a deterioration in the equality of society.”348  This seems no different 
than the purpose he had in using Blanch’s image.  It was also certainly not 
Rogers’ purpose in creating “Puppies,” which was to satisfy his commission to 
photograph his friend’s eight new German Shepherd puppies.349 
In addition to changing the purpose and meaning of Blanch’s photograph, 
the court also found it relevant that Koons had changed its colors, the medium, 
the size of the objects pictured, and the objects’ details.350  Likewise, Koons 
changed the colors, medium, size, and certain details of Rogers’ photograph.351  
This fact also lends support for the argument that Koons’ “String of Puppies” 
was transformative.  Finally, if Koons’ use of Rogers’ photograph had been 
deemed transformative, then the other statutory factors – such as the creative 
nature of Rogers’ work – would have carried less weight. 
 
 343. Id. at 262 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 344. Id. at 248 (majority). 
 345. Id. at 258. 
 346. Id.  
 347. Id.  
 348. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992); see id. at 304 (noting that 
Koons worked in the tradition of art where once “the artist finishes his work, the mean-
ing of the original object has been extracted and an entirely new meaning set in its 
place”). 
 349. Id. at 304. 
 350. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253. 
 351. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308. 
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3. Cariou v. Prince 
Cariou v. Prince352 was a game-changer, and to some it reshaped the def-
inition of transformative and elevated its importance among the fair use factors. 
In the case, Patrick Cariou, a professional photographer, brought a copyright 
infringement lawsuit against celebrity appropriation artist Richard Prince for 
using several of his photographs without permission.353  The photographs came 
from Cariou’s book, Yes Rasta, which consisted of classical portraits and land-
scape photographs taken when Cariou lived among Rastafarians in Jamaica.354 
After Prince discovered Yes Rasta, he tore out thirty-five photographs 
from the book and pinned them to a piece of plywood to create a collage, titled 
Canal Zone (2007).355  “Prince altered those photographs significantly, by 
among other things painting ‘lozenges’ over their subjects’ facial features.”356  
Some of the other photographs were only partially used.357  Later, Prince pur-
chased additional copies of Yes Rasta so that he could create thirty additional 
artworks in the Canal Zone series.358  Twenty-nine of those appropriated partial 
or whole images from Yes Rasta.359  The amount of the Cariou photographs 
used and the alteration to the images varied depending on the work.360  In some 
works, Cariou’s original photograph was hardly recognizable because it was 
greatly obscured.361  In other works, Prince left Cariou’s work relatively un-
touched and just painted blue lozenges over the Rastafarian’s eyes and mouth 
and a guitar over his body.362 
After Cariou sued, Prince argued that his works were transformative and 
should be considered fair use.363  Both parties moved for summary judgment, 
and the Southern District of New York held that in order to qualify for a fair 
use defense under § 107, Prince’s work had to “comment on Cariou, on Car-
iou’s Photos, or on aspects of popular culture closely associated with Cariou or 
the Photos.”364  Not only did the district court then grant summary judgment to 
Cariou, but it also ordered all infringing copies of Cariou’s photographs to be 
delivered up for “impounding, destruction, or other disposition.”365 
 
 352. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).  See generally, Brian Sites, Fair Use and the New 
Transformative, 39 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 513 (2016). 
 353. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698. 
 354. Id.  
 355. Id. at 699. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 699–700. 
 361. Id. at 700. 
 362. Id. at 701. 
 363. Id. at 704. 
 364. Id.  
 365. Id.  
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The art world was initially rocked by the lower court’s decision, and it 
quickly split into two camps.  “Team Prince” consisted of elite art museums 
such as The Metropolitan Museum of Art, The Art Institute of Chicago and, 
several famous artists’ estates, including The Andy Warhol Foundation for the 
Visual Arts, Inc. and the Robert Rauschenberg Foundation.366  On the other 
side, representing “Team Cariou,” were organizations that represented “day-
to-day working visual artists and authors,” including the American Society of 
Media Photographers, Picture Archive Association of America, The Digital 
Media Licensing Association, Professional Photographers of America, Na-
tional Press Photographers Association, Graphic Artists Guild, American Pho-
tographic Artists, and the American Society of Journalists and Authors.  All of 
these organizations filed amici briefs.367 
On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court applied the 
incorrect standard to determine whether Prince’s artworks made fair use of 
Cariou’s copyrighted photographs.368  Chastising the lower court, it stated that 
there was no legal requirement “that a secondary use comment on the original 
artist or work, or popular culture.”369  Instead, for a work to be transformative 
it merely needed to “alter the original with ‘new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.’”370 
Applying that standard, the Second Circuit then took the unusual step of 
using its own artistic judgment to analyze the works.  Specifically, it held that 
twenty-five of the artworks were transformative as a matter of law because 
Prince’s “hectic and provocative” works manifested an entirely different aes-
thetic from Cariou’s “serene and deliberately composed” photographs – even 
 
 366. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, 
Inc. in Support of Defendant-Appellants and Urging Reversal, Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 
(No. 11-1197-cv), 2011 WL 5517867; Brief for Amici Curiae the Association of Art 
Museum Directors, The Art Institute of Chicago, The Indianapolis Museum of Art, The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, The Museum of Modern Art, Museum Associates, dba 
Los Angeles County Museum of Art, The New Museum, The Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Foundation, The Walker Art Center, and The Whitney Museum of American Art in 
Support of Appellants and Reversal, Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (No. 11-1197-cv), 2011 WL 
5517864; see Cat Weaver, Will Round Two of Cariou v. Prince Change Art Law For-
ever? HYPOALLERGIC (Jan. 13, 2012), https://hyperallergic.com/44938/cariou-v-
prince-change-art-law-part-1/. 
 367. E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Society of Media Photographers, Inc. 
and Picture Archive Council of America, Inc. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Af-
firmance, Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (No. 11-1197-cv), 2012 WL 435237; Brief Amici Cu-
riae of the American Photographic Artists, American Society of Journalists and Au-
thors, American Society of Media Photographers, Graphic Artists Guild, Jeremy 
Sparig, National Press Photographers Association, Picture Archive Council of Amer-
ica, and Professional Photographers of America in Support of Plaintiff Patrick Cariou, 
Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (No. 08 CIV 11327 (DAB)).  
 368. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712. 
 369. Id. at 698. 
 370. Id. at 706 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994)). 
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though some of Prince’s work used Cariou’s photographs in their entirety.371  
Further, the Second Circuit was influenced by the fact that Prince’s “composi-
tion, presentation, scale, color palette, and media [were] fundamentally differ-
ent and new compared to the photographs, as [was] the expressive nature of 
Prince’s work.”372 
The Second Circuit disregarded the fact that Prince testified during his 
deposition that “he ‘do[es]n’t really have a message,’ that he was not ‘trying to 
create anything with a new meaning or a new message,’ and that he ‘do[es]n’t 
have any . . . interest in [Cariou’s] original intent’” as meaningless.373  The 
court stated that “Prince’s work could be transformative even without com-
menting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even without Prince’s stated in-
tention to do so.”374  Instead, the court said the focus should be on how “the 
work in question appears to the reasonable observer.”375 
As to the fourth factor, while the court recognized the commercial nature 
of Prince’s artwork, it discounted that fact in light of the transformative nature 
of his works.376  The court contrasted the audience for Prince’s work – the per-
forming artists and business moguls Jay-Z and Beyoncé, the professional foot-
ball player Tom Brady, the model Giselle Bundchen, the Vogue editor Anna 
Wintour, among others – with that of Cariou’s – mostly personal acquaintances 
and family members.377  The court also compared Prince’s earnings from the 
exhibition – he sold eight artworks from the series for a total of $10,480,000 
– to the paltry $8,000 Cariou made in royalties.378 
In creating the Canal Zone series, Prince reproduced and manipulated 
Cariou’s photographs and layered other visual elements over them.379  Simi-
larly, musical artists like N.W.A. reproduce and manipulate samples and layer 
other aural elements over them.  Just as Richard Prince’s visual collages re-
sulted in new expression being created, so too can aural collages result in new 
expression being added to the samples.380 
 
 371. Id. at 706–07. 
 372. Id. at 706. 
 373. Id. at 707 (alterations in original). 
 374. Id.  
 375. Id. 
 376. See id.  
 377. Id. at 709. 
 378. Id.  
 379. See id. at 706. 
 380. Although Cariou was a triumphant victory for Prince, he subsequently was 
sued in four other lawsuits arising out of his New Portraits exhibition, where he appro-
priated Instagram shots from various users’ accounts and made minor alterations to 
them.  See Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Complaint for 
Copyright Infringement and Demand for Jury Trial, Dennis Morris, LLC v. Prince, No. 
2:16-cv-03924 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2016); Complaint for Copyright Infringement and 
Demand for Jury Trial, Salazar v. Prince, No. 2:16-cv-04282 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2016); 
Complaint and Jury Trial Demanded, McNatt v. Prince, No. 1:16-cv-08896 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 16, 2016).  Dennis Morris and Salazar subsequently settled, and McNatt is still 
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4. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc. 
While many criticized the holding in Cariou that an artistic work need not 
comment on the original work to be transformative, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this principle in Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.381  
That case involved the band Green Day’s unauthorized use of an image of a 
“screaming, contorted face” created by Seltzer and titled Scream Icon.382  
Green Day used Scream Icon in a four-minute video that served as a prominent 
visual backdrop during their live concert performances.383  Although defend-
ants used the entire image of Scream Icon, they modified the work “by adding 
a large red ‘spray-painted cross over the middle of the screaming face” and by 
“chang[ing] the contrast and color and add[ing] black streaks running down the 
right side of the face.”384 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants and held that Green Day’s use was 
transformative because it “alter[ed] . . . the expressive content or message of 
the original work.”385  Green Day used Scream Icon as “a street-art focused 
music video” whose message was about religious hypocrisy and Christian-
ity.386  In contrast, Seltzer admitted that Scream Icon’s message was something 
different that had nothing to do with religion.387  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Green Day’s use “convey[ed] new information, new aesthetics, new 
insights and understandings that are plainly distinct from those of the original 
piece” even though the video made few physical changes to Scream Icon and 
did not comment on it.388 
Nothing in Blanch, Cariou, or Seltzer limits their holdings to visual arts 
cases.  The expanded definition of transformative found in these cases should 
be applied in digital sampling cases, too.  This Article’s proposed Digital Music 
Sampling Code will incorporate the principles derived from those cases to de-
termine what should be considered fair use in digital sampling. 
 
pending as of the date this Article was written.  In Graham, Prince tested the boundaries 
of fair use and the Cariou decision by bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on 
the grounds of fair use.  Graham, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 376.  The court denied this motion 
because it could not “conclude that any of the four fair use factors favor[ed] defendants” 
and it was “evident that Prince’s work does not belong to a class of secondary works 
that are so aesthetically different from the originals that they can pass the Second Cir-
cuit’s ‘reasonable viewer’ test as a matter of law” and thus were not transformative.  Id. 
at 380 (alterations in original).   
 381. 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 382. Id. at 1173. 
 383. Id. at 1174. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 1177 (emphasis omitted). 
 386. Id. at 1176–77. 
 387. Id. at 1177. 
 388. Id. (quotations omitted). 
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C. A New Hope for Digital Music Sampling 
1. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone 
While Bridgeport was followed in the Sixth Circuit, which encompasses 
the country music capital Nashville, Tennessee, district courts in other circuits 
declined to follow its holding.389  Then in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone,390 the 
Ninth Circuit threw down the gauntlet and declared a circuit split by refusing 
to follow Bridgeport.391  As of the time this Article was written, the United 
States Supreme Court has not taken up the issue. 
VMG Salsoul involved a 0.23 second segment of horns from the song 
“Love Break,” which was sampled in pop star Madonna’s popular hit 
“Vogue.”392  The district court held that the copying was de minimis and did 
not constitute copyright infringement.393  Therefore, on appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit was forced to directly confront the issue of whether to follow or reject the 
Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule that there is no de minimis exception for sound 
recordings.394 
The court began its analysis by noting that the de minimis doctrine is well-
established in the law and dates back to the mid-1800s.395  It also recognized 
the public policy reason behind the rule: “If the public does not recognize the 
appropriation, then the copier has not benefitted from the original artist’s ex-
pressive content.”396 
The court properly framed the issue as follows: did “Congress intend[] to 
eliminate the longstanding de minimis exception for sound recordings in all 
circumstances even where, as here, the new sound recording as a whole sounds 
nothing like the original[?]”397  The court then debunked the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the statute.398  Looking at several provisions, including §§ 102 
and 106, the court found no express evidence of intent on the part of Congress 
to treat sound recordings differently than other protected works except as to 
public performance.399  Moreover, nothing on the face of the statute expressly 
stated that Congress intended to eliminate the de minimis doctrine with respect 
to sound recordings.400 
 
 389. See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Since 
the Sixth Circuit decided Bridgeport, almost every district court not bound by that de-
cision has declined to apply Bridgeport’s rule.”); see also supra notes 314–15. 
 390. 824 F.3d at 886. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 887. 
 393. Id. at 874. 
 394. See id. 
 395. Id. at 880. 
 396. Id. at 881. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit recognized that § 114(b) imposes “an express limitation 
on the rights of a copyright holder” because the holder cannot prevent others 
from duplicating the sounds of his or her recording in a new recording.401  The 
court then declined to follow the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of this statute as 
giving the copyright holder the exclusive right to sample his or her own record-
ing.402  To do so would be to read “an implicit expansion of rights into Con-
gress’ statement of an express limitation on right” and did not make sense in 
light of the longstanding acceptance of the de minimis doctrine.403  The Ninth 
Circuit also criticized the Sixth Circuit for failing to take into consideration the 
legislative history that supported the Ninth Circuit’s view that Congress did not 
intend to expand the rights of sound recording copyright holders by eliminating 
the de minimis exception as to sound recordings.404 
It is too early to tell whether VMG Salsoul has had any effect on music 
industry sampling practices.  Because of the circuit split, it remains unsettled 
whether de minimis sampling will result in liability.  Until the United States 
Supreme Court or Congress clarifies the matter, risk-averse music companies 
fearing litigation in the Sixth Circuit or elsewhere may still demand that all 
samples be licensed. 
2. Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records 
In 2017, Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records405 became the first case 
to apply the fair use principles from Cariou and Blanch to digital music sam-
pling.  In Estate of Smith, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for copyright in-
fringement for using a sample from a spoken-word sound recording entitled 
“Jimmy Smith Rap” by the late jazz musician Jimmy Smith.406  Specifically, 
the hip-hop recording artist Drake sampled about thirty-five seconds of the 
“Jimmy Smith Rap” (“JSR”) on the track “Pound Cake/Paris Morton Music 2” 
(“Pound Cake”), including Smith’s spoken statement that “Jazz is the only real 
music that’s gonna last.”407  However, only the copyright to the musical com-
position was at issue because the defendants had obtained a license to use the 
sound recording.408 
Citing to Blanch and Cariou, the Southern District of New York held that 
Pound Cake transformed JSR because it fundamentally altered the message of 
JSR; thus, the fair use doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ claims.409  The court noted 
that “the key phrase” of JSR was “Jazz is the only real music that’s gonna last.  
 
 401. Id. (italics omitted). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 883 (italics omitted). 
 404. Id. at 883–84. 
 405. 253 F. Supp. 3d 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 406. Id. at 742. 
 407. Id. at 743. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. at 750–51. 
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All that other bullshit is here today and gone tomorrow.  But jazz was, is and 
always will be.”410  Smith’s message was that jazz trumped all other popular 
music.411  Meanwhile, in Pound Cake, Drake edited JSR to say, “Only real 
music is gonna last.”412  In so doing, Drake transformed JSR by changing the 
message to one that “real music,” regardless of genre, has staying power.413  
The court further found that the defendants used a reasonable amount of the 
original work and that Pound Cake did not usurp any market for JSR or its 
derivatives.414 
While the altering of words was at issue in this case, nothing in the court’s 
decision suggests that only words, as opposed to instrumental sounds, can be 
transformative.415  This case provides a ray of hope that the more liberal fair 
use principles from Cariou and Blanch can be applied in digital sampling cases 
to find fair use. 
3. Oyewole v. Ora 
Oyewole v. Ora416 is another case involving the alleged sampling of a 
musical composition that was found to be transformative and dismissed on a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion.  The plaintiff, Abi-
odun Oyewole, a founding member of one of the first American hip-hop 
groups, The Last Poets, alleged that rap artist The Notorious B.I.G. sampled 
“When the Revolution Comes” and remixed the refrain “party and bullshit” 
without authorization in B.I.G.’s song “Party and Bullshit.”417  In addition, 
Oyewole alleged that defendant Rita Ora infringed “When the Revolution 
Comes” in her song “Party” by “borrow[ing] the refrain, punch line, crescendo, 
and text hook ‘Party and Bullshit’ . . . .”418 
Citing to Cariou, the district court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal be-
cause Oyewole had admitted in his complaint that the defendants had used the 
phrase “party and bullshit” for a different “purpose.”419  While Oyewole’s orig-
inal purpose was to “encourage[ ] people to NOT waste time with ‘party and 
 
 410. Id. at 750. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. (alteration in original). 
 413. Id. at 750–51. 
 414. Id. at 752. 
 415. See generally id.  
 416. 291 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed, No. 18-1311, 2018 WL 
6734771 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 417. Id. at 425–26. 
 418. Id. at 427. 
 419. Id. at 434 (“Indeed, Oyewole acknowledges that the B.I.G. and Rita Ora De-
fendants use the phrase ‘party and bullshit’ ‘in contravention’ of Oyewole’s original 
purpose . . . .”). 
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bullshit,’” the defendants sought to glorify the partying lifestyle.420  By chang-
ing the “the meaning and purpose of the phrase ‘party and bullshit,’” defend-
ants transformed it.421 
The district court also held that under the fourth fair use factor, the 
“[d]efendants’ songs [we]re unlikely to ‘usurp’ the market for ‘When the Rev-
olution Comes’” because the defendants’ works were “different in character 
and purpose from the original work.”422  Despite that The Last Poets were mu-
sical grandfathers to hip-hop artists like B.I.G., the court also held that the de-
fendants and the plaintiff likely had different target audiences.423  Accordingly, 
the court held that the defendants’ sampling was fair use.424 
This case demonstrates that even the literal sampling of words can be 
transformative because often those words can be used to have a very different 
meaning.  Moreover, it shows that even within the broad category of hip-hop 
music, there can be different target audiences. 
4. Estate of Barré v. Carter 
A final recent music sampling case worth noting is Estate of Barré v. 
Carter,425 which reaffirmed the principle that defendants may assert a fair use 
defense in cases of digital sampling of a sound recording.  After Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, many people in the music industry wrongfully 
believed that the rule of law was “[g]et a license or do not sample.”426  This 
included the plaintiff in Barré who argued that “the fair use doctrine does not 
apply to instances of digital sampling of a sound recording.”427  The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana corrected this misunderstanding 
and emphasized that “the fair use doctrine is a statutory exception under the 
Copyright Act . . . and [the p]laintiffs have not pointed to any language in sec-
tion 107 of the Copyright Act that excludes the fair use affirmative defense in 
instances of digital sampling.”428  Nonetheless, the court denied the defendants’ 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because it was required to accept all well-
pleaded facts as true and found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the de-
fendants did not add “new expression, meaning or message” to the unmodified 
Barré clips.429 
 
 420. Id. at 434. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. at 436. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 917 (E.D. La. 2017). 
 426. See id. at 929. 
 427. Id. at 930. 
 428. Id.  
 429. Id. at 932–33. 
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The takeaway from this case is that there is no blanket rule that all music 
samples must be licensed.  Therefore, the music industry should stop acting 
like there is.430 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR 
DIGITAL MUSIC SAMPLING 
Cases such Oyewole, Barré, and Estate of Smith show that artists are be-
coming emboldened to assert their right to fair use of digital sampling in light 
of the decisions in Cariou and Seltzer.  The Ninth Circuit’s blatant defiance of 
Bridgeport may lead to greater assertion of the right to use unlicensed samples.  
Taken together, these recent cases involving famous artists like Beyoncé, Ma-
donna, Notorious B.I.G., and Drake have the potential to open the floodgates 
for unlicensed samples.  The other thing that these cases demonstrate is that 
sampling is no longer a marginalized practice just done by young, African-
American male rappers.431  Now, big name musicians from all genres of music 
use digital samples in their works, and the big record company labels are the 
ones asserting the fair use defense. 
Since the controversial Grand Upright decision in 1991, numerous solu-
tions have been proposed to enable the practice of digital sampling.432  Many 
have called for a compulsory licensing system similar to the one under § 115 
for mechanical licenses for cover songs.433  This solution has been repeatedly 
 
 430. Unfortunately, Barré settled in February 2018 before the court ruled on the 
scope of the fair use defense in a sound recording digital sampling case. 
 431. Some scholars have argued that digital sampling is treated differently than 
other art forms and more often labeled theft because of the fact that it started as a largely 
African-American practice limited to the genres of rap and hip-hop.  See, e.g., Arewa, 
supra note 21, at 580. 
 432. See Ponte, supra note 20, at 57 & n.118.  
 433. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Achenbach, Grey Area: How Recent Developments in 
Digital Music Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory Licens-
ing for Sample-Based Works, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 187, 200–04 (2004); Reuven Ashtar, 
Theft, Transformation, and the Need of the Immaterial: A Proposal for a Fair Use Dig-
ital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 261, 263–64 (2009); Menell, supra 
note 17, at 488. 
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criticized and rejected.434  Others have advocated for the reform of the Copy-
right Act to accommodate digital sampling,435 but these efforts have gone no-
where.  Meanwhile, some have called for all parties in the music industry to 
come together to develop guidelines for fair use in sampling.436  It seems that 
now more than ever, the music industry may be ready for a change.  By devel-
oping a code of best practices, stakeholders in the music industry can begin the 
dialogue of what constitutes fair use and what needs to be licensed.  These 
guidelines would be similar to the statements and codes of best practices in fair 
use that other creative communities have created, which will be examined be-
low. 
A. History of Statements of Best Practices in Fair Use 
In 2005, Peter Jaszi, a professor at American University’s Washington 
College of Law, and Patricia Aufderheide, a Professor in the School of Com-
munication at American University and Director of the Center for Social Me-
dia, worked with the community of documentary filmmakers to produce the 
Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use (“Filmmak-
ers’ Statement”).437  The Filmmakers’ Statement was intended to clarify the 
 
 434. See, e.g., Dina LaPolt & Steven Tyler, Comment Letter on Department of 
Commerce’s Green Paper on Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digi-
tal Economy (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/lapolt_and_ty-
ler_comment_paper_02-10-14.pdf (representing the views of Steven Tyler and append-
ing comments by Don Henley, Joe Walsh, Andre Young (Dr. Dre), Gordon Sumner 
(Sting), Joel Zimmerman (deadmau5), Ozzy Osbourne, Mick Fleetwood, Britney 
Spears, and Billy Joel); Chris Johnstone, Note, Underground Appeal: A Sample of the 
Chronic Questions in Copyright Law Pertaining to the Transformative Use of Digital 
Music in a Civil Society, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 426–30 (2004) (“The benefits of sim-
plification afforded by a compulsory scheme along the lines of section 115 are purely 
illusory.”); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms 
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535, 569–70 (2004). 
 435. John S. Ehrett, Comment, Fair Use and an Attribution-Oriented Approach to 
Music Sampling, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 655, 659 (2016) (proposing a “sampling-focused 
amendment to the Copyright Act”). 
 436. USPTO, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES 
28 (2016), http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/copyright/white-
paper-remixes-first-sale-and-statutory-damages (“[T]he Task Force encourages stake-
holders to develop guidelines and best practices for remixing . . . .  While such an ex-
ercise is likely to focus on fair use as the principal doctrine governing remixes, other 
copyright doctrines may also inform the discussion, such as the idea-expression dichot-
omy and the doctrine of de minimis taking.”); see also MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 
45, at 217, 243. 
 437. ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ 
STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), http://www.centerforso-
cialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/bestpractices.pdf. 
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doctrine of fair use and to help filmmakers confidently determine when to em-
ploy the doctrine.438  Since its release, the statement has had a major impact on 
business practices in the community.439  For example, it was once almost im-
possible to obtain errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurance for films that con-
tained unlicensed copyrighted materials.440  Without this insurance, a film had 
little hope of being distributed.441  Now, E&O insurers are willing to accept 
fair use claims and insure films as long as a lawyer asserts that the fair use 
claims are supported by the Filmmakers’ Statement.442  This, in turn, has led to 
more documentary filmmakers asserting their right to fair use.443 
After the success of the Filmmakers’ Statement, Professors Jaszi and Auf-
derheide continued to champion the best practices movement.  In their book, 
Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright, (“Reclaiming 
Fair Use”), Aufderheide and Jaszi urged communities of copyright users to 
develop their own best practices and provided a template for doing so.444  This 
resulted in a number of other creative communities producing their own ver-
sions of best practices statements.  To date, at least fifteen codes and statements 
of best practices have been generated using the framework from Reclaiming 
Fair Use.445  These codes have been drafted for everything from journalism to 
poetry and dance. 
The CAA adopted its Visual Arts Code in 2015.446  The Visual Arts Code 
was based on a consensus of visual arts professionals, such as artists, art edu-
cators, designers, curators, and museum directors, who use copyrighted mate-
rials in their work.447  The Visual Arts Code explains fair use principles in more 
understandable terms that are related to the activities of visual artists.448  The 
Visual Arts Code describes five situations where there was consensus that the 
 
 438. Id. 
 439. See Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Documentarians, Fair Use and Best 
Practices: Surprising Successes, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 8.  
 440. Michael C. Donaldson, Fair Use: What a Difference a Decade Makes, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 331, 332 (2010).  
 441. Id.  
 442. Documentarians, Fair Use, and Best Practices, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. 
IMPACT, https://cmsimpact.org/resource/documentarians-fair-use-and-best-practices/ 
(last visited May 28, 2019) (“Over half of those surveyed (60%) reported that they had 
recently employed fair use in a production, and almost all reported having no difficulty 
with insurance (99%) or broadcasters (95%) accepting fair use . . . .”). 
 443. See id. 
 444. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT 
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011). 
 445. See Codes for Best Practices, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, http://cmsim-
pact.org/codes-of-best-practices/ (last visited May 28, 2019); see also BRIANNA L. 
SCHOFIELD & ROBERT KIRK WALKER, FAIR USE FOR NONFICTION AUTHORS (2017), 
https://www.authorsalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/AuthorsAllianceFairUs-
eNonfictionAuthors.pdf. 
 446. Visual Arts Code, supra note 18. 
 447. Id. at 2. 
 448. Id. at 6–7. 
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fair use doctrine should apply.449  For each situation, it then sets forth a guiding 
principle for application of the fair use doctrine, subject to certain limita-
tions.450  Although the Visual Arts Code is relatively young, it has already been 
successful in teaching artists about their right to fair use and in changing in-
dustry practices.451 
There are a number of benefits to the codes of best practices, but educa-
tion is by far the greatest.  The codes provide a framework, written in plain 
English instead of legalese, that teaches people how to analyze fair use situa-
tions.  The Visual Arts Code includes supporting materials that provide con-
crete examples of how fair use principles are applied.452  By educating people 
about their right to fair use in language that they understand, they become em-
powered to assert their rights.453  The codes also provide guidance to rights 
holders so that they, too, understand when fair use is and is not appropriate.454  
In addition, codes may help educate courts as to best practices in a professional 
community in “cases where there are legal gaps . . . or where there is a need to 
interpret open standards.”455 
Fair use codes are not without criticism, and the Survey attempted to ad-
dress and work around some of these criticisms.  For example, the Visual Arts 
Code and other fair use codes have been criticized for ignoring the copyright 
holders whose works are being used without permission.456  These parties 
should be stakeholders in the process of developing fair use guidelines.  Seek-
ing input from the rights holders will help minimize later dissent from the codes 
and will illuminate the areas where there is agreement as to fair use.  Therefore, 
the Survey recruited not only performers who sample but also songwriters, pro-
ducers, publishers, and music label professionals who generally are the copy-
right owners of sampled content.  Also, a number of respondents reported that 
 
 449. Id. at 8. 
 450. Id. 
 451. The CAA conducted its first survey on the results of the CAA Visual Arts 
Code in 2016, and it reported “significant change in the field’s practice.”  A Fair Use 
Code Changes Practice in the Visual Arts: The Numbers, CAA NEWS TODAY (Aug. 4, 
2016), http://www.collegeart.org/news/2016/08/04/a-fair-use-code-changes-practice-
in-the-visual-arts-the-numbers/.  This included a rise in the number of artists asserting 
fair use for the first time and a large percentage of institutions revising their fair use 
policies based on the code.  Id. 
 452. See Classroom Discussion: Teaching Script About Fair Use in Making Art, 
CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, http://cmsimpact.org/fair-use/related-materi-
als/codes/fair-use-codes-best-practices (last visited May 28, 2019). 
 453. Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices State-
ments in the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 371, 386 
(2010) [hereinafter Rothman, Best Intentions]. 
 454. Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 5. 
 455. Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Taking Users’ Rights to the Next 
Level: A Pragmatist Approach to Fair Use, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L. J. 1, 27 (2015). 
 456. Rothman, Best Intentions, supra note 453, at 372.  See generally Jennifer E. 
Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1899 (2007). 
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other musicians had sampled their work.  Moreover, with respect to the sam-
pling of sound recordings, the owners of those copyrights – frequently the rec-
ord labels – have dual interests.457  While some of the artists signed to their 
label may use samples – the “samplers” – other artists on their label may be the 
ones being sampled – the “samplees.”  Sometimes, the same artist may be both 
a sampler and a samplee.458  Record labels who have an interest in both sides 
may help generate fairer solutions for all stakeholders. 
Another criticism of the codes is that they allegedly “state what the draft-
ers wish fair use was.”459  This is not necessarily a fair criticism, especially 
with respect to the Visual Arts Code, which conversely has been criticized as 
merely restating the statutory fair use factors in different language.460  The Dig-
ital Music Sampling Code, like the other codes, attempts to distill what the 
relevant fair use principles are and how they would apply in music cases using 
illustrative examples.  It does not attempt to create bright-line rules that do not 
exist, such as a rule that two-seconds of a song is automatically fair use.  One 
frequent critic of fair use codes has suggested that they should “be reconfigured 
to analyze current fair use precedents and give more specific legal guid-
ance.”461  This is exactly what the Digital Music Sampling Code seeks to do. 
As previously mentioned, a specific criticism of the Visual Arts Code is 
that it admittedly “recapitulate[s] the law of fair use,”462 as set forth in the stat-
utory factors.  As a result, some claim that it does not really clarify the doc-
trine.463  However, this narrow view of the Visual Arts Code ignores the sup-
porting materials that are meant to be used in conjunction with the Visual Arts 
Code, which include, among other things, a PowerPoint presentation,464 a “You 
Be the Judge” test with illustrative examples,465 a video,466 and frequently-
asked-questions.467 
 
 457. See supra notes 120–23. 
 458. For example, artist Jay-Z frequently samples and is sampled himself.  See Jay-
Z, WHO SAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/Jay-Z/ (last visited May 28, 2019). 
 459. Rothman, Best Intentions, supra note 453, at 377. 
 460. Rosemary Chandler, Putting Fair Use on Display: Ending the Permissions 
Culture in the Museum Community, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 60, 80 (2016). 
 461. Rothman, Best Intentions, supra note 453, at 386. 
 462. See Classroom Discussion: Teaching Script About Fair Use in Making Art, 
supra note 452. 
 463. See Chandler, supra note 460, at 80. 
 464. See supra Section II.B. 
 465. See Fair Use in Visual Arts: You Be The Judge!, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. 
IMPACT http://cmsimpact.org/resource/you-be-the-judge/ (last visited May 28, 2019). 
 466. See Center for Media & Social Impact, Fair Use at Work in the Visual Arts, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wC-wfVfIXiw&fea-
ture=youtu.be. 
 467. See Fair Use Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, 
http://cmsimpact.org/resource/fair-use-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited May 
28, 2019). 
49
Eckhause: Digital Sampling v. Appropriation Art: Why Is One Stealing and th
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
420 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
A final criticism of the Visual Artists Code and other similar fair use state-
ments is that they impose a requirement of attribution to the original author.  
The response to this criticism will be discussed in greater detail below.  While 
fair use codes may have garnered criticism, they still represent a significant 
step towards correcting the clearance culture problems. 
B. Developing a Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Digital Music 
Sampling 
In their book, Reclaiming Fair Use, Professors Aufderheide and Jaszi 
provide a template for creating a code of best practices: 
• Find networks and organizations in the community of practice (not the 
gatekeepers, but the creators/users). 
• Document the kinds of problems the community has with using cop-
yrighted material; get good stories! 
• Circulate the results of this documentation to the community; tell the 
stories. 
• Host or cohost small-group conversations on interpreting fair use; use 
the stories to locate the problem areas and discuss how to apply fair use 
to those problem areas. 
• Draft a code of best practices, using templates to the extent they are 
helpful. 
• Have an advisory board of supportive lawyers review and revise the 
draft, to ensure that the code of best practices conforms to the law. 
• Get endorsements from community organizations for the code. 
• Circulate news through community networks and organizations. 
• Document your successes. 
• Publicize your successes.468 
Following the template from start to finish is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  However, the first four steps of this framework have been accom-
plished through the Survey as well as through the research of Professors Kem-
brew McLeod, Peter DiCola, and others.469  The groundbreaking work of Pro-
 
 468. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 444, at 128 (bullet points added). 
 469. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 217. 
50
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/6
2019] DIGITAL SAMPLING V. APPROPRIATION ART 421 
fessor McLeod has been influential in exposing the problems the hip-hop com-
munity has in using copyrighted samples.  He has written numerous books470 
on the subject and even produced a documentary.471  Numerous law review 
articles also have chronicled the frustrations of artists who seek to sample.472  
The lawsuits cited in this Article further demonstrate the legal risks that musi-
cians encounter when they sample. 
The Survey has also exposed problems artists face in sampling.  For ex-
ample, a number of respondents reported that they had to either remove a track 
or not record a track because they could not get permission or a license to use 
a sample or it was too difficult to get permission or a license.  Some had to 
substitute one sample for another because of difficulties in licensing.  Others 
had to recreate the music in a sample or hire musicians to do so because they 
could not get permission or a license.  The stifling of creativity is obvious.  The 
majority of respondents stated that if permission was not needed to use sam-
ples, they would use more samples than they do now.  Another respondent 
noted that he or she only uses samples offered under “clear Creative Commons 
licensing by the original artists.”  A different respondent stated that “the current 
legal framework benefits no one but large media companies.”  Meanwhile, an-
other complained, “The amount of money wasted in the court systems by one 
ridiculous ongoing lawsuit after another in the cases of sampling and copyright 
infringement is completely out of control.”473  In light of these problems, a new 
approach to sampling – one that does not revolve around the licensing of every 
snippet – is needed. 
C. Survey Methodology and Results 
This Section explains the methods used to conduct the Survey and shares 
some of the notable results. 
 
 470. See, e.g., KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS 
COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY 69 (2005); Kembrew McLeod, 
How Copyright Law Changed Hip-Hop, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: APPROPRIATION 
ART, INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 21, at 155; see also 
KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION IN THE 
AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2007). 
 471. See Sampling: An Overview, INDEPENDENT LENS, http://www.pbs.org/inde-
pendentlens/copyright-criminals/sampling.html (last visited May 28, 2019). 
 472. E.g., Josh Norek, Comment, “You Can’t Sing Without the Bling”: The Toll of 
Excessive Sample License Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Need for a 
Compulsory Sound Recording Sample License System, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 91 
(2004); Ashtar, supra note 433; John W. Gregory, A Necessary Global Discussion for 
Improvements to U.S. Copyright Law on Music Sampling, 15 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 4 
(2012). 
 473. It should be noted that no respondents actually reported having been sued or 
threatened with a lawsuit because of sampling. 
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1. Methodology 
The Survey questioned music professionals about their opinions, experi-
ences, and practices concerning digital music sampling.474  In particular, the 
Survey questioned participants about the circumstances, if any, under which 
they believe sampling of third-party copyrighted material should be allowed 
without permission from the copyright owner.  The survey instrument was 
based in part on the questionnaire developed by the CAA in support of its Vis-
ual Arts Code.475  The Survey was approved by the Committee for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects at the University of California, Berkeley. 
2. Recruitment 
The Survey participants were required to be at least eighteen years old, 
reside in the United States, and be professionals in the music industry.  Infor-
mation about the study and a request for Survey participants was posted 
through a variety of means, including music industry group websites and 
listservs, Facebook group pages relating to music, Craigslist websites across 
the country, and chat boards.  The Survey also relied on a snowball strategy for 
recruitment.  Specifically, emails were sent to colleagues in the music industry 
asking them to consider taking the Survey and to distribute it to others who 
might be interested. 
3. Respondents 
Recruitment occurred from March 22, 2018, to May 6, 2018, and resulted 
in eighty-eight respondents.476  They included performers, songwriters, pro-
ducers, deejays, publishers, technicians, and independent and major record la-
bel professionals.  They came from all genres of music including R&B/hip-
 
 474. No personally identifiable information was collected as part of the Survey and 
all data was kept secure.  The Survey was also configured so that researchers were not 
given the participants’ Internet Portal (IP) address, and therefore, it was nearly impos-
sible to link Survey results with the participants. 
 475. See PATRICIA AUFERHEIDE ET AL., COPYRIGHT, PERMISSIONS, AND FAIR USE 
AMONG VISUAL ARTISTS AND THE ACADEMIC AND MUSEUM VISUAL ARTS 
COMMUNITIES, AN ISSUES REPORT (2014), http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/FairUseIs-
suesReport.pdf. 
 476. However, six responses were not usable because those respondents were under 
the age of eighteen or resided outside of the United States.  Also, it should be noted that 
not all respondents answered every question. 
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hop/rap, country, Christian/gospel and classical, and no one genre predomi-
nated.477  Respondents came from sixteen states with California and Texas be-
ing the most represented.478   Respondents spanned all age groups from eight-
een to twenty-nine years old to over sixty-five years old,479 and 61.82% iden-
tified as male.480 
4. Overall Results 
Of respondents who answered the question, 56.92% reported having 
taken a piece of an existing sound recording and using it in a new musical 
work.481  61.81% believed that whether an artist should seek permission or ob-
tain a license to use a sample of another artist’s work depended on the circum-
stances,482 and 36.36% stated that permission or a license for sampling should 
always be sought.  Approximately 55% of respondents believed that no per-
mission was required when the owners of the sample could not be found, and 
49% believed that permission was not needed when the sample was not recog-
nizable.  The other top reasons respondents felt justified using a sample without 
permission or a license included heavy alteration of the sample (41%), the short 
length of the sample (31%), and the sample was being used for criticism or 
commentary (33%).  Notably, all respondents who answered the question be-
lieved that artists should at least under some circumstances receive attribution 
when their work is sampled.483 
D. A Draft Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Digital Music      
Sampling 
The next step in the Reclaiming Fair Use framework and the ending point 
for this Article is the drafting of a preliminary Digital Music Sampling Code.  
It is based on the Survey results, copyright caselaw, and the other fair use 
codes.  Continuing with the analogy between digital sampling and the visual 
arts, the Digital Music Sampling Code draws largely on the Visual Arts Code.  
 
 477. Participants also included musical professionals working in pop/adult, rock, 
Latin, dance/electronic, jazz, heavy metal, folk, and other genres. 
 478. Twenty-four respondents lived in California and twenty lived in Texas. 
 479. 48.78% respondents fell into the thirty to forty-nine year-old age group. 
 480. Only fifty-five respondents answered this question; 32.73% identified as fe-
male and 5.45% preferred not to answer. 
 481. Only sixty-five respondents chose to answer this question. 
 482. Fifty-five respondents answered this question.  36.36% of them thought that 
permission or a license should “usually, with some exceptions” be sought for samples, 
and 25.45% thought that “sometimes depending on the circumstances” permission or a 
license for samples should be sought. 
 483. 45.45% believed that artists should always receive attribution, 32.73% be-
lieved that artists “usually, with some exceptions” should receive attribution, and 
21.82% believed that artists “sometimes depending on the circumstances” should re-
ceive attribution. 
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While that code was specifically created for visual artists, musical artists 
should have the same right to incorporate copyrighted materials into their 
works as visual artists. 
The situation in the Visual Arts Code that is most analogous to digital 
sampling is Making Art.  This Section begins with a “description” of the history 
and current practice of artists making art by incorporating the work of others. 
Next, it sets forth the fundamental principle that fair use is available as a de-
fense when incorporating the copyrighted material of others.  Finally, it con-
cludes with proposed limitations on the application of the fair use doctrine.  
The Digital Music Sampling Code will follow a similar framework. 
As discussed previously in this Article, digital sampling is a form of the 
artistic practice of collage, and therefore, the description of artists incorporat-
ing the works of others applies equally to musical artists.  Indeed, the Visual 
Arts Code refers to the making of new art that incorporates existing sounds of 
sound.484  With a few minor modifications as noted below in brackets, the Mak-
ing Art description is also used as the description for the Digital Music Sam-
pling Code. 
1. Proposed Description 
DESCRIPTION: For centuries, artists have incorporated the work of 
others as part of their creative practice.  Today, many artists occasion-
ally or routinely reference and incorporate [music, whether sound re-
cordings or musical compositions] in their own creations.  Such quota-
tion is part of the construction of new culture, which necessarily builds 
on existing culture.  It often provides a new interpretation of existing 
works, and may (or may not) be deliberately confrontational.  Increas-
ingly, artists employ digital tools to incorporate existing (including dig-
ital) works into their own, making uses that range from pastiche and 
collage (remix), to the creation of new soundscapes . . . [and record-
ings.]  Sometimes this copying is of a kind that might infringe copy-
right, and sometimes not.  But whatever the technique, and whatever 
may be used (from motifs or themes to specific . . . sounds), new art can 
be generated.485 
2. Proposed Principle 
Next, the Visual Arts Code articulates a “principle” for the application of 
the fair use doctrine when making art, which is subject to several limitations.486  
Just like the Visual Arts Code, the Digital Music Sampling Code cannot define 
bright-line rules as to which works qualify as fair use.  As the Department of 
Commerce Internet Policy noted, “Best practices and guidelines cannot be 
comprehensive codes enumerating everything that can be done in a particular 
 
 484. Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 11. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. 
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realm of activity.”487  Rather, the Digital Music Sampling Code describes a 
principle and several limitations to guide artists in determining whether fair use 
applies.  The main goal of the Digital Music Sampling Code is to teach artists 
how to analyze situations and apply fair use principles. 
Although a few minor revisions were needed – which also are noted in 
brackets – the Making Art principle is also used for the Digital Music Sampling 
Code: 
PRINCIPLE: Artists may invoke fair use to incorporate copyrighted 
material into new [music, whether sound recordings or musical compo-
sitions,] subject to certain limitations.488  
The application of this principle to digital sampling should not be contro-
versial.  The court in Estate of Barré v. Carter489  specifically held that musical 
artists may assert the fair use doctrine in cases involving the digital sampling 
of a sound recording. Moreover, Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records,490 
demonstrates this principle in action.  In that case, the musical artist Drake 
successfully invoked the fair use defense when incorporating an unauthorized 
musical composition sample into his song. 
3. Proposed Limitations 
Finally, the Digital Music Sampling Code, like the Visual Arts Code, rec-
ognizes that fair use has limitations.  These limitations arise from § 107 of the 
Copyright Act, fair use caselaw, and community ideals.491  The limitations in 
the Digital Music Sampling Code parallel those found in the Visual Arts Code 
and include the need for new artistic meaning, a justifiable artistic objective, 
and attribution. 
a. New Artistic Meaning Needed 
The first limitation, with some minor rewording, is: 
LIMITATION. Artists should seek licenses for uses of existing copy-
righted material that do not generate new artistic meaning.492 
This limitation recognizes the principle that “to qualify as a fair use, a 
new work generally must alter the original with ‘new expression, meaning, or 
 
 487. USPTO, supra note 436, at 28. 
 488. Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 11. 
 489. 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 917 (E.D. La. 2017). 
 490. 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 491. See Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 8, 14–15. 
 492. Id. at 11 (“Artists should avoid uses of existing copyrighted material that do 
not generate new artistic meaning, being aware that a change of medium, without more, 
may not meet this standard.”). 
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message.’”493  It also recognizes the principle from Blanch that when a sampler 
uses the original work as “raw material . . . in furtherance of distinct creative 
or communicative objectives,” the result is transformative and thus fair use.494  
Therefore, when applying this limitation, one factor that may be considered is 
whether the sampler’s purpose in using the copyrighted work is different than 
the original artist’s purpose in creating that work.495 
Digital sampling can result in new artistic meaning being given to the 
original work in several ways.  New artistic meaning can occur when the mes-
sage of the original work is fundamentally altered, as was the case in Estate of 
Smith v. Cash Money Records described above, where the rapper Drake had a 
different purpose in using the sample than the jazz musician Jimmy Smith had 
in creating the original track.496  In some cases, a work can be transformed 
when it is broadcasted to a different audience, although merely using the sam-
ple in a different genre than the original song may not be enough by itself.497 
Digital sampling also may be transformative where it results in new ex-
pression being given to the original work.  Songs that use richly-layered sam-
ples could result in new artistic meaning and aesthetics from the multiple mu-
sical quotations.498  Songs that alter the original work or render it unrecogniza-
ble may be deemed as adding new expression.499  Just as the visual artist Koons 
 
 493. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
 494. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 495. Estate of Smith, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 750 (finding use was transformative, and 
thus, a fair use where the defendant’s purpose in using a key phrase from original com-
position was vastly different than original artist’s goal). 
 496. Id. 
 497. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 
2014) (finding use transformative where “Bloomberg’s purpose … was to publish this 
factual information to an audience from which Swatch Group’s purpose was to with-
hold it”); see also Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 93–
94 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[A] parodic work [that] goes beyond simple parody and also 
transposes the original work into a new genre, . . . could have an effect on potential 
markets for derivative works that recreate the work in the new genre without parodying 
it [and therefore may not be fair use.]”).  But see Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 
282, 290 (D.N.J. 1993) (rejecting the notion that “a work could be immune from in-
fringement so long as the infringing work reaches a substantially different audience 
than the infringed work. In such a situation, a rap song, for instance, could never be 
held to have infringed an easy listening song or a pop song.”). 
 498. Barcroft Media, Ltd. v. Coed Media Grp., 297 D. Supp. 3d 399, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 2, 2017) (“Original works clearly may be transformed through the addition of text 
or other forms of expression.”); Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708 (finding fair use where artist 
altered copyrighted photographs into a collage which had “a different character, give 
Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics with creative and 
communicative results distinct from Cariou’s.”). 
 499. Cf. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 700 (deeming defendant’s work transformative in 
some instances where the original photographer’s work was almost entirely obscured).  
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was held to have transformed the plaintiff’s photograph in Blanch by 
“chang[ing] . . . its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the 
medium, the size of the objects pictured, [and] the objects’ details,” a musical 
artist could transform a sound recording by changing its tempo or pitch or trans-
posing it to a different key and layering in other vocals, musical instruments, 
or sonic elements.500  Similarly, using such techniques, a musical artist could 
transform the mood, character, and aural aesthetics of a song just as Richard 
Prince transformed Cariou’s “serene and deliberately composed portraits and 
landscape photographs” into “crude and jarring,” “hectic and provocative” 
works.501 
Conversely, songs that make “no alteration to the expressive content or 
message of the original work” that they sample would not be fair use.502  New 
artistic meaning would not be generated where an artist samples a key hook 
from a song and loops it throughout a new track with no alteration.503  Many 
artists agree that this would require a license.504  A license would also be re-
quired if an artist samples a popular song with the hope that the audience will 
recognize it and turn the new song into a hit. 
b. Artistic Objective Needed for Sampling 
The second limitation, which is identical to the one in the Visual Arts 
Code, is: 
The use of a preexisting work, whether in part or in whole, should be 
justified by the artistic objective, and artists who deliberately repurpose 
copyrighted works should be prepared to explain their rationales both 
for doing so and for the extent of their uses.505 
 
Further, 49% of Survey respondents felt that samples that were not recognizable did 
not require permission or a license to be used. 
 500. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Cariou, 714 F.3d 
at 706 (finding the defendant’s works transformative where the “composition, presen-
tation, scale, color palette, and media [were] fundamentally different and new com-
pared to the photographs”). 
 501. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706. 
 502. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that 
these types of cases are typically non-transformative). 
 503. See MC Hammer, U Can’t Touch This, on DON’T HURT ‘EM (Capitol 1990); 
see also L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 938–939 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Merely plucking the most visually arresting excerpt from LANS’s nine minutes of 
footage cannot be said to have added anything new.”). 
 504. One Survey respondent said, “Conversely, if you have an artist like Diddy us-
ing a sample of The Police’s Every Breath You Take as his entire song, then that should 
definitely require clearance and payment because a new artistic work hasn’t really been 
created.” 
 505. See also Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 11. 
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This limitation arises in part out of the first factor of the fair use doctrine 
and from the pronouncement in Blanch that an “artist must provide a sufficient 
justification for using another’s copyrighted material in effecting the artist’s 
vision.”506 
One well-accepted justification for sampling is parody.507  Parody is “a 
recognized category of criticism or comment authorized by section 107.”508  
The Supreme Court defined parody as a  
 
literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author 
or a work for comic effect or ridicule or as a composition in prose or 
verse in which the characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an author 
or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make them appear 
ridiculous.509   
 
The Supreme Court recognized in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. that par-
ody “‘has an obvious claim to transformative value,’ . . . and deciding that the 
new work is a parody necessarily entails finding that the new work is trans-
formative” and thus fair use.510 
Another example of an artistic objection that justifies using someone 
else’s copyrighted music is political or social commentary or criticism.511  
 
 506. Morris v. Guetta, LA CV12-00684 JAK (RZx), 2013 WL 440127, at *8 (C.D. 
Ca. Feb. 4, 2013).  But see Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (“What is critical is 
how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist 
might say about a particular piece or body of work.”). 
 507. See, e.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that rapper Ghostface Killah’s use of the melody of “What a 
Wonderful World” in his sarcastic song “The Forest” was a transformative parody and 
a fair use because he portrayed a “world [that] is corrupted and ridden with crime and 
drugs” in contrast to the “unrealistically uplifting” message of the original song); see 
also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (holding that a 2 
Live Crew song that parodied the Roy Orbison song “Pretty Woman” was transforma-
tive and fair use because it “was clearly intended to ridicule the white-bread original” 
by “substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones . . . [that] derisively demon-
strat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison song seems to them”); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.) (“I Love Sodom,” a “Saturday Night 
Live” television parody of “I Love New York,” is fair use).   Thirty-one percent (31%) 
of Survey respondents believed that sampling for parody purposes does not require per-
mission or a license. 
 508. Adjmi v. DLT Ent. Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 509. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. 
 510. Abilene Music, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
579). 
 511. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Where the 
[alleged infringer’s] use is for the purposes of ‘criticism, comment . . . scholarship, or 
research,’ 17 U.S.C. § 107,” the first factor “will normally tilt in the [alleged in-
fringer’s] favor”); see also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“Among the best recognized justifications for copying from another’s work is 
to provide comment on it or criticism of it.”); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 
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“‘[C]riticism’ and ‘comment’ are classic examples of fair use,”512 and, like par-
ody, they have “an obvious claim to transformative value.”513  For instance, on 
the records, It Takes a Nation and Fear of a Black Planet, Public Enemy sam-
pled political speeches and news broadcasts as a means of political commen-
tary and to invoke “the black power era of the late 1960s and early 1970s.”514  
Political commentary raises First Amendment and free speech issues and jus-
tifies the use of the samples.  As has been noted in another code, “Comment 
and critique are at the very core of the fair use doctrine as a safeguard for free-
dom of expression.”515  Also, it should be noted that the commentary does not 
need to be directed at the original work or author.516  Instead, the sample can 
be used for commentary about society at large.517 
In addition, under this limitation, the artist must be prepared to justify the 
amount of the preexisting work that is used.  This limitation arises out of the 
third factor of the fair use doctrine that assesses the “amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”518  It also 
takes into consideration whether the use is de minimis and whether the sample 
 
731, 736 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]here is a strong presumption that factor one favors the 
defendant if the allegedly infringing work fits the description of uses described in sec-
tion 107,” including “criticism” and “comment”); see also Samuelson, supra note 5, at 
2571 (noting that using copyrighted works for social or cultural commentary in docu-
mentary films may be fair use but the “more substantial the use and the more promi-
nently the prior work’s expression is featured, the less likely a use is to be fair”).   
Thirty-three percent (33%) of Survey respondents believed that sampling for criticism 
or commentary purposes does not require permission or a license. 
 512. Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp.3d 34, 43, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding 
that YouTube “reaction video” mocking another YouTube video-maker was fair use). 
 513. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 156 F. Supp.3d 425, 444–
45 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 674 Fed. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 514. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 45, at 238. 
 515. See Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Online Video, CTR. FOR MEDIA & 
SOC. IMPACT, http://cmsimpact.org/code/code-best-practices-fair-use-online-video/ 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2019) [Hereinafter Online Video Code]. 
 516. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[E]ven 
where . . . the allegedly infringing work makes few physical changes to the original or 
fails to comment on the original” it can still be transformative); Cariou v. Prince, 714 
F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding no requirement that the copied work comment on 
the original work or its author in order to be transformative). 
 517. But see Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 
92 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (hypothesizing that cases “where the original song itself is used 
(essentially in its entirety) to comment on negative aspects of the real or imagined 
world[]” rather than commenting on the song itself, would “typically require[] licens-
ing”).  However, this dictum may be overruled in light of the holdings in Cariou.  See 
supra Section III.B.3.; see also Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (where a filmmaker’s use of fifteen seconds of a John Lennon song 
for social commentary was deemed fair even though he was not commenting on the 
original song). 
 518. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2018).  Thirty-one percent (31%) of respondents believed 
that sampling without permission or a license is justified when a sample is short. 
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is quantitatively or qualitatively sufficient to support copyright infringe-
ment.519 
There are no bright-line rules when it comes to how much of the original 
work a sample can take.520  There are many cases where a sample that takes 
less than four seconds of the original work has been deemed fair use or de 
minimis.521  Courts also have held that the sampling of a single note “is de 
minimis and cannot support a claim of copyright infringement” in many cases 
because one note is not by itself copyrightable.522  Similarly, a court may find 
a sample to be de minimis when it is barely discernable in the song523 or has 
been heavily distorted.524 
However, when the sample represents the heart of the work, permission 
may be required even if the sample constitutes a few words or seconds.525  For 
 
 519. TufAmerica, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 67 F. Supp. 3d 590, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
 520. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (“There are 
no absolute rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be 
considered a fair use”). 
 521. See, e.g., TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (finding a three-second drum sequence not quantitatively significant to a six-
minute song); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding de 
minimis copying where the average audience would not recognize the composition 
sample that consisted of three notes, C-D flat-C sung over a background C note played 
on the flute); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2016)  
(finding de minimis copying of musical composition where only one instrument group 
was copied and it was only a single horn hit comprised of four notes – E-flat, A, D, and 
F – and a double-horn hit consisting of an eighth-note chord of those same notes fol-
lowed by a quarter-note chord of the same notes). 
 522. Poindexter v. EMI Record Grp., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 559 (LTS)(JLC), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 42174, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012) (citing Swirsky v. Carey, 376 
F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] single musical note would be too small a unit to 
attract copyright protection (one would not want to give the first author a monopoly 
over the note of B-flat for example)”); McDonald v. Multimedia Entm’t, Inc., No. 90 
Civ. 6356(KC), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10649, 1991 WL 311921, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 
19, 1991) (“[I]t is extremely doubtful that [a] single note and its placement in the com-
position is copyrightable.”). 
 523. WB Music Corp., 67 F. Supp. 3d at 598 (“the fact of the matter is that the 
samples appear only faintly in the background . . . and are, at best, only barely percep-
tible to the average listener”). 
 524. Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, No. 179, 2014 WL 12591933, at *8 n.8 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014) (holding the sample was de minimis where “the result of these distortions 
and the short length of the samples is that the average audience would not recognize 
Plaintiffs’ Song in any of Defendants’ songs without actively searching for it”). 
 525. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that copying was not de minimis where the 
copied musical phrase went to “the heart of the [original] composition”); 4 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 301, § 13.03[A][2][a] (“[E]ven if the similar material is quan-
titatively small, if it is qualitatively important, the trier of fact may properly find sub-
stantial similarity.”); see also Menell, supra note 17 at 498–99. 
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example, in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,526 the Sixth Cir-
cuit upheld a jury verdict that the defendant had committed copyright infringe-
ment by sampling the phrase, “Bow wow wow, yippie yo, yippie yea,” which 
was the refrain from the song, “Atomic Dog.”  The court found that this phrase 
was “the most well-known aspect of the song – in terms of iconology, perhaps 
the functional equivalent of ‘E.T., phone home,’” and therefore, the court up-
held the jury’s rejection of the defendant’s fair use defense.527 
When determining whether the amount taken was justifiable, courts will 
consider whether it was necessary to take such amount to accomplish the sam-
pler’s purpose in using the music.528  This means that a parodist may be justi-
fied in taking the heart of the work without permission because parodies “must 
be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of [the original work] to make the object 
of its critical wit recognizable.”529 
Another factor that must be considered is whether the new work usurps 
the market for the original work or its derivatives.530  This limitation derives 
from the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine.531  As one best practices code 
notes, “The use [of the preexisting material] should not be so extensive or per-
vasive that it ceases to function as critique and becomes, instead, a way of sat-
isfying the audience’s taste for the thing (or the kind of thing) that is being 
quoted.”532  In other words, the new song should not become a market substi-
tute for the original work from where the sample is derived.533  This is rarely a 
problem for parodies that tend to poke fun at the original work.534   And works 
that sample from different genres of music or target different listening audi-
ences are unlikely to become a market substitute for the original work.535 
 
 526. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 272 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 527. Id. at 276. 
 528. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994); see also Estate 
of Smith v. Cash Money Records, 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 751–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (find-
ing thirty-five seconds of one-minute track was reasonable amount for purpose of mak-
ing point that “only ‘real’ music – regardless of creative process or genre – will stand 
the test of time”). 
 529. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
 530. Estate of Smith, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 752. 
 531. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2018). 
 532. See Online Video Code, supra note 515. 
 533. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
 534. Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (“[N]o reasonable jury could find that The Forest would cause substantial harm 
to the market for Wonderful World; anyone interested in purchasing a recording of 
Wonderful World would not turn to the three-line, off-key rendition used in The Forest 
instead.”); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We do not believe that 
consumers desirous of hearing a romantic and nostalgic ballad such as the composers’ 
song would be satisfied to purchase the parody instead. Nor are those fond of parody 
likely to consider [the original] a source of satisfaction.”). 
 535. Estate of Smith, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 752 (finding no evidence that “Pound Cake 
usurps any potential market for JSR or its derivatives.  JSR, a spoken-word criticism of 
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There are a number of common reasons that artists use samples that would 
not be deemed justifiable and thus fair use.  If an artist is sampling just to save 
the time and expense of creating those sounds, that would not be fair use.536  If 
an artist lacks the instruments or talent to re-create the sound, that would not 
be justifiable.  It has also been suggested that using a sample to “create the 
tone, mood, setting and location” of the song alone is not transformative.537 
c. Attribution 
The third limitation, which is virtually identical to the one in the Visual 
Arts Code, is: 
When copying another’s work, an artist should cite the source . . . unless 
there is an articulable aesthetic basis for not doing so.538 
While attribution is not legally required in the United States, the results 
of the Survey showed that respondents were universally in support of some 
form of attribution depending on the circumstances.  The United States recog-
nizes very limited moral rights for authors.  The Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990 (“VARA”) provides a limited right of attribution to authors of photo-
graphs created for exhibition, paintings, drawings, prints, and sculptures exist-
ing in a single copy or a limited edition of 200 or less.539  Beyond this, there 
are no requirements of attribution under U.S. law, and there are no require-
ments under VARA that authors of musical compositions or sound recordings 
be given attribution.540  Therefore, several commentators have expressed con-
cern with codes that contain an attribution limitation because it is not a legal 
 
non-jazz music at the end of an improvisational jazz album, targets a sharply different 
primary market than Pound Cake, a hip-hop track.”), appeal filed, No. 18-1311, 2018 
WL 6734771 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 
2013) (holding the defendant’s art appealed to a different art collector audience than 
plaintiff’s weighed in favor of fair use). 
 536. Abilene Music, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (suggesting that it would not be fair 
use to merely take “the melody of a popular song purely for the sake of convenience”); 
see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (“[When] the alleged infringer merely uses [the 
copied work] to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, 
the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it 
does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.”). 
 537. See Estate of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 916 (E.D. La. 2017) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to avoid dismissal of case under Rule 
12(b)(6) where the plaintiff argued that the defendants’ use of the sample was not trans-
formative because it was done to “create the tone, mood, setting and location of the 
New Orleans-theme ‘Formation’”). 
 538. Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 11. 
 539. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 540. But see Jane Ginsburg, The Most Moral of Rights: The Right to be Recognized 
as the Author of One’s Work, 8 GEO. MASON J. OF INT’L COM. L. 44, 45 (2016); Jane 
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requirement but instead one of etiquette.541  Because this is an important issue 
to the community, the Digital Music Sampling Code includes a limitation rec-
ognizing the need for attribution.  However, the code also acknowledges that 
there may be certain situations in which attribution would not be appropriate 
or desirable. 
Finally, the limitation from the Visual Arts Code stating that “[a]rtists 
should avoid suggesting that incorporated elements are original to them, unless 
that suggestion is integral to the meaning of the new work” was deleted from 
the Digital Music Sampling Code.542  This limitation is somewhat inapplicable 
because, for most digital samplers, there “never [is] any attempt to conceal the 
fact that they [are] working from prerecorded sounds rather than composing 
their own original music.  On the contrary, they openly celebrate[] their method 
of sampling.”543 
E. Next Steps 
The Survey, which was conducted in a rather limited time period, is not a 
substitute for the type of expansive survey done by the CAA in support of its 
Visual Arts Code.  Over 2,000 members of the CAA participated in its sur-
vey.544  Rather, the Survey sought to preliminarily ascertain the musical com-
munity’s opinions and practices regarding digital sampling and to determine 
whether there was an appetite for a fair use code.  Given that 61.81% of re-
spondents believed that sampling should be allowed under certain circum-
stances with no permission, the question then becomes what are those circum-
stances?545  The next step is to hold focus groups and perhaps further surveys 
to define those circumstances.  Also, the usefulness of the Visual Arts Code is 
enhanced by its supporting materials, including a PowerPoint presentation, il-
lustrative examples, a video, and frequently-asked-questions – all of which fur-
ther flesh out how fair use principles should be applied in certain situations.546  
Similar documents should be created to accompany the Digital Music Sam-
pling Code. 
 
 
C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademark Laws, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 284–85 (2004). 
 541. Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 17 (admitting that the Visual Arts Code 
incorporates “widely and strongly held community values not tied to language of the 
Copyright Act”); see also Rothman, Best Intentions, supra note 453. 
 542. Visual Arts Code, supra note 18, at 11. 
 543. Shusterman, supra note 80, at 617. 
 544. See generally AUFERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 475. 
 545. See supra text accompanying note 482. 
 546. See supra notes 464–67.  
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CONCLUSION 
Recent cases have shown that courts are starting to move past the rule, 
“Get a license or do not sample.”547  Perhaps now more than ever the music 
industry is ready for a change.  This Article hopes to prompt the industry to 
come together to adopt fair use guidelines.  This Article does not advocate for 
bright-line rules classifying all sampling as per se fair use.  Just as some appro-
priation art is copyright infringement, some digital sampling will require a li-
cense, too.  While this Article sets forth draft principles, the next steps are up 
to the stakeholders in the music industry.  The point is that it is time for musical 
artists to reclaim their right to fair use, and it is time to put digital music sam-
pling on the same legal par as other artistic collage practices. 
 
 
 547. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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